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Introduction: Workshop on the Institutional Foundations of Innovation 
and Competitiveness in East Asia 
 
Werner Pascha, Cornelia Storz, Markus Taube (eds.) 
 
 
The workshop series on the role of institutions in East Asian Development tries to make a 
contribution to the development of theoretical approaches to East Asian Studies. Institutional 
theory is found to be particularly helpful, as it encompasses a rich variety of approaches that 
deal with the organisation of socio-economic phenomena in different circumstances. This 
holds for the different schools of institutional economics, including new institutional 
economics like property rights, principal-agent, incentive, transaction cost and contract 
theory, but it also holds for the wider approaches to institutional theory in the social sciences 
and beyond. The yearly workshops are a gathering of senior and junior scholars who are 
interested to develop a theory-based view of regional studies and of those interested to apply 
their institutional knowledge to East Asian phenomena. 
 
Revised papers of the 2007 workshop, held at the Protestant Academy in Tutzing at Lake 
Starnberg, in view of the Alps in Upper Bavaria, are presented in the present discussion paper. 
The general subject of the 2007 meeting was an assessment of the institutional foundations of 
innovation and competitiveness in East Asia. What those foundations are is a key question 
that scholars outside East Asian studies are interested in, and for which we were looking for 
contributions from an institutional perspective. Why have the East Asian economies been 
growing so strongly? More particularly: What are the institutional and organisational 
conditions under which this success was possible? Will there be change? What does this mean 
for their further development? 
 
The collected papers approach these issues from various angles. Joachim Ahrens and Patrick 
Jünemann (Private University of Applied Sciences, Göttingen, and European Business 
School, Oestrich Winkel) take up a puzzle of the recent spectacular success of the Chinese 
economy: Although one might expect, at first glance, that economic growth was due to fully 
embracing the advantages of a market economy, in the understanding of the authors this was 
actually not the case. Rather, China made use of “transitional institutions”, as the authors call 
them. Ahrens and Jünemann analyze them from the viewpoint of the “varieties of capitalism” 
approach and discuss possible future courses. They conclude that the duality of the economic 
and the political realm as well as wide-spread bureaucratic behaviour are likely to remain. 
 
Johannes Meuer and Barbara Krug (Erasmus University, Rotterdam) take up another key 
factor that is frequently associated with China’s economic success, namely the presence of 
network ties that goes beyond the simple distinction of markets and firms. The authors 
undertake a careful literature survey and identify four approaches to networks, namely 
Chinese business groups (qiyejituan), Overseas Chinese Communities, networks of social 
relations (guanxi), and Network Capitalism as an alternative economic model. Through their 
theory-focused lens, they identify gaps within the individual approaches that might guide 
future research. For instance, they argue that “Chinese business groups” and “Overseas 
Chinese Communities” studies could profit from structuralist research that looks into concrete 
personal and professional ties. 
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Dominik Schlossstein (European Business School, Oestrich-Winkel) deals with another East 
Asian success story: the phenomenal rise of South Korea’s economic competitiveness. He 
applies a national innovation system framework and argues that upstream governance of the 
innovation system was critically important to bring the economic successes about. On this 
basis, Schlossstein is particularly concerned about future challenges, namely those of 
effectiveness, efficiency and efficacy. Generally, he feels that the restructuring of the 
innovation system from “imitation to innovation” is well under way. 
 
Alexander Müller (Philipps University, Marburg) contributes to a topic that is important for 
Japan’s future economic path, namely for the prospects of convergence or divergence with 
other advanced economies. A key issue in this field is whether global standards are readily 
adopted in Japan or not. Müller studies this with respect to the implementation of the widely 
accepted SAP R/3 Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software in the Japanese automotive 
industry. He notices that SAP R/3 is widely used, but rather as a quality standard signalling 
best practice than as a compatibility standard, because the complex Japanese supplier system 
are not easy to integrate in the SAP R/3 standard. This finding sheds a sobering light on the 
widely held expectations that the spreading of global standards will lead to a convergence of 
Japanese development patterns with other leading economies. 
 
The contributors shed light on different aspects of innovation and development, and were 
inspired by different theoretical approaches, such as the concept of varieties of capitalism, 
network theories or standardisation economics. One heatedly discussed topic of all 
contributions was the relevance of multiple equilibria, and how differentiated our analysis has 
to be in order to explain real world phenomena. A further issue was the necessity of 
considering the role of actors in the development of institutional paths. Summing up, the 
contributions offer interesting insights into vital aspects of competitiveness and economic 
progress in East Asia, and are challenging both for regional specialists as for those interested 
in institutional studies. 
 
The organisers plan to continue the workshop series in cooperation with the Tutzing 
Protestant Academy (Evangelische Akademie). The next workshop is scheduled for March 
2008 and will again take place in conjunction with the Tutzing (German-language) conference 
series on Normative and Institutional Foundations of Economics. Depending on the submitted 
papers, the workshop may be held in English too. Those interested in attending or in 
presenting a paper are invited to get in touch with any of the workshop organisers signing 
below. For the documentation of earlier workshops see http://www.vsjf.net/de/ 
aktiv.php?back=ja&aid=1 on the homepage of the German Association for Social Science 
Research on Japan. 
 
We would to thank all those who contributed to make the workshop and its documentation a 
success, including Martin Held, Gisela Kubon-Gilke, Richard Sturn of the Tutzing conference 
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The paper focuses on institutional change and institution building as integral parts of economic 
transition in China. China’s success, particularly compared with other advanced transition 
economies, implies a puzzling observation: China did not apply theoretically-derived policy 
recommendations. Instead, authorities followed a gradual, pragmatic approach to reform, 
decentralize, and transform the economy. Notable examples of non-orthodox policy measures, 
which worked effectively in China, include so-called transitional institutions such as the dual-
track approach to industrial restructuring, anonymous banking, the establishment of special 
economic zones or the priority given to create competitive structures while postponing large-
scale privatization of state-owned enterprises. 
Hence, it is not evident what kind of market economy will emerge in China in the long run. 
The paper aims at (i) applying the Varieties-of-Capitalism (VoC) framework to China and 
assessing its suitability in a transition context; (ii) addressing the question of what kind of market 
economy is emerging in China; (iii) analyzing the impact which the emerging type of capitalism 
will have on the economy’s allocative and dynamic efficiency; and (iv) elaborating policy 
implications which may help generate or strengthen potential institutional complementarities in 
the long run. 
 
 
JEL classification: H0, O53, P2, P3 
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1  Introduction 
One of the most important events in modern economic history is the socialist countries’ 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a capitalist market economy that started in the 
last two decades of the 20
th century. China’s transition was very successful compared to the 
difficulties experienced by countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union: 
China’s annual economic growth has been consistently higher than 7% for the last decade; the 
country has managed to attract increasing amounts of FDI and successfully fought poverty across 
the nation.
1 China did however not follow theoretic policy recommendations developed by 
Western think tanks such the IMF or the World Bank, but pursued an incremental, gradual, and 
highly pragmatic “Chinese” approach to transform its economy into a capitalist system.  
The ‘Varieties of Capitalism’
2 literature claims that there are two coordination regimes that vary 
systematically across countries: at one end of the spectrum there are liberal market economies 
(LMEs) that use markets as their main means of coordinating economic activity. At the other 
end, coordinated market economies are identified that rely more heavily on non-market 
institutions to solve their coordination problems. This binary classification of national forms of 
capitalism leaves many countries in an ambiguous position, since they cannot be clearly 
categorized. France and Italy are examples of such intermediate countries in the developed 
world.
3 One crucial characteristic of the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach is that it has been 
developed to analyze advanced market economies and does not offer any theoretic explanation as 
to how to classify transition economies – such as China. The objective of this paper is to apply 
the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ framework to the institutional reform process in China and to test 
its validity within a transition context. The ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ analysis will serve as a 
foundation to derive an answer to the question as to what kind of capitalism is currently being 
developed in China. Has China’s transition process taken the way towards a LME or rather a 
CME or does China actually represent a certain third “hybrid form” of capitalism that cannot be 
classified according to the standard ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ concept? How efficient, stable and 
sustainable is China’s variety of capitalism?  
                                                 
1 Cp. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (2000), pp. 1 – 10. 
2 Cp. HALL/ SOSKICE (2001), KITSCHELT ET AL. (1999), AMABLE (2003), CROUCH/ STREECK (1997), AMABLE 
(2000), DORE/ LAZONIK/ O’SULLIVAN (1999), HALL/ GINGERICH (2004), STREECK/ YAMAMURA (2001). 
3 Cp. AMABLE (2003), p. 79. 
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In order to address these questions, this research paper is organized as follows. First, necessary 
background information on the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ theory that frames this research into 
China’s economic transition is presented. Thereafter an in-depth analysis of China’s reform 
process is offered focusing on those five institutions that are at the core of the ‘Varieties of 
Capitalism’: the development of China’s financial system, industrial relations, the country’s 
inter-firm relationships and intra-firm relations, as well as the situation of education and 
vocational training. The paper then moves on to offer an insight into the interplay of the 
described institutions and addresses the question whether the Chinese model is complementary 
and therefore efficient. During the course of the analysis, several questions arise around the 
applicability of the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach within a transition context. The postulates 
of the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ framework are critically reflected when it is applied within a 
transition context and major shortcomings are discussed. Finally a perspective on what kind of 
capitalism is really emerging in China is offered: a hybrid form that does neither adhere to a 
LME nor a CME model will be put up for discussion. A critical review of the main findings 
concludes.  
 
2  The ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach 
Since the breakdown of communism at the end of the 20
th century, capitalism is considered as 
the unrivalled model of economy and society – a conviction deeply rooted in Western culture.
4 
The early 1990s saw a widespread ascendancy of neo-liberal thought indicating that a singular 
world of market unification and institutional convergence was about to emerge. But soon after 
this vision of a unitary and all-encompassing capitalism had been expressed, critics of this 
concept started to voice their concerns, pointing to “ostensibly resilient differences in the 
organization and trajectories of capitalist systems, regimes and models”.
5  
The “Varieties of Capitalism” literature offers extensive studies on the historical evolution of 
different national types of capitalism in developed economies - notably of Britain, the US, Japan 
and Germany. It provides a framework for analyzing and understanding the institutional 
similarities and differences among developed economies. Especially Hall and Soskice (2001)
6 
                                                 
4 Cp. MILLER (2005), p. 1. 
5 PECK/ THEODORE (2005), p. 1. 
6 Cp. HALL/ SOSKICE (2001), pp. 1 – 68.  
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present a central framework claiming that national economic development and economic policies 
in advanced economies follow path-dependent trajectories of two kinds: liberal market 
economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs) that differ with regard to the 
types and configurations of their implied economic institutions. LMEs are exemplified by the 
US, Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, CMEs by Germany, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Denmark and Japan. Both types are seen as 
extreme forms of political economies that represent the two limits of a spectrum along which 
nations can be arrayed.  
In LMEs, transactions are mainly organized through competitive market arrangements and 
hierarchies. The preference for market oriented institutions within LMEs induces a typical 
pattern of corporate behavior: firms will invest in “switchable assets” such as general skills and 
multi-purpose technologies, because these do not tie up corporate resources in the long-run, but 
instead facilitate a short-run realization of value.
7 This implies that companies are inclined to be 
more attentive to current earnings and to their share price on equity markets. Moreover, LMEs 
are characterized by deregulated labor markets, and strong product-market competition. In 
CMEs, however, there is a much higher tendency to invest corporate resources into “specific 
assets”, the value of which cannot be realized rapidly, but which is instead based on both the 
availability of patient capital and the expectation of complementary, cooperative behavior of 
other actors.
8 Hence, a longer-term orientation prevails, and coordination problems are primarily 
solved drawing on non-market relationships such as networks and centralized associations – the 
so-called strategic coordination. This preference for network-based approaches in one sphere – 
e.g. in the financial system – is likely to produce mutually reinforcing spillover effects in related 
institutional domains:
9 Therefore, other characteristics of CMEs include cooperative industrial 
relations, high levels of vocational training, weakened product-market competition and strong 
information exchanges through more or less formal professional associations favoring the 
establishment of common industrial standards.
10  Both types thus represent coherent 
configurations of complementary institutional elements meaning that they are presumed to be 
stable and self-reinforcing. They are hence expected to react in more or less predictable ways: an 
                                                 
7 Cp. PECK/ THEODORE (2005), p. 21. 
8 Cp. PECK/ THEODORE (2005), p. 21. 
9 Cp. PECK/ THEODORE (2005), p. 21. 
10 Cp. AMABLE (2003), p. 78. 
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Emergence and Change of Institutions 
When analyzing a transition economy, key attention must be given to an understanding as to how 
institutions – the deliberate incentive structure of a society - change and evolve. This paper is 
based on North’s (2005) concept of institutional change. Institutions conceived as the formal and 
informal rules of the game define the constraints on patterns of human interaction. In an 
economic sense this means interaction in order to deal with scarcity, hence competition for 
resources.
12 The structure a society imposes to order that competition shapes the way the game is 
played.
13 Change in this structure is brought about by agents, namely decision makers in 
organizations, who act depending on the opportunities they see that again depend on their mental 
models. So either through external changes in the environment or through changed mental 
models (e.g. due to new knowledge/skills) institutional change will be initiated by these agents. 
Thereby, alternative choices become superior, and change in the design of an institution occurs, 
if altering the existing framework is less costly than contracting within the old one. Changes in 
the formal rules may stem from legislative changes such as passing a new law.
14 Changes in 
informal rules (e.g. norms, conventions) arise gradually and often rather subconsciously and 
more slowly as individuals develop alternative patterns of behavior that are in line with their new 
evaluation of costs and benefits. Hence, change is usually an incremental and path-dependent 
process: “The reason is that the economies of scope, the complementarities, and the network 
externalities that arise from a given institutional matrix of formal rules, informal constraints, and 
enforcement characteristics will typically bias costs and benefits in favor of choices consistent 
with the existent framework.”
15 Thus, the direction of change processes is determined by path 
dependence, because political and economic organizations which have emerged as a result of the 
institutional matrix naturally have a stake in maintaining the existing framework. The remaining 
question, particularly in analyzing the successful transition case of China, is how an institutional 
matrix emerges that encourages productive activity. Particularly in a transition context, many 
                                                 
11 Cp. MILLER (2005), p. 16. 
12 Cp. NORTH (2005), p. 1. 
13 Cp. NORTH (2005), p. 1. 
14 Cp. HALL/ THELEN (2005), p. 23. 
15 NORTH (1994), p. 6. 
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former socialist economies such as Russia have learned painfully that the underlying institutional 
framework was the source of their poor performance in their transition process and have now 
been trying to find ways to restructure the institutional framework to redirect incentives that in 
turn will direct organizations to a productivity-enhancing path. This paper seeks to shed some 
light on the reasons why China has managed to embark on a productivity-enhancing path by 
focusing on gradual change processes of key institutions. 
 
Institutional complementarity 
Institutional complementarity would exist if one (or more) institution(s) enhance the effects of 
(an)other institution(s). For example, if the efficacy of labor market institutions depends on a 
specific type of institutions for corporate governance, then efforts to assess the impact of labor 
market arrangements that do not also consider the nature of corporate governance may generate 
misleading conclusions.
16 This interaction effect holds for most kinds of institutions. Streeck, 
Crouch and other researchers point out that institutions are not always designed to be 
complementary – complementarity is often discovered at a later stage in time.
17 This means that 
a high degree of experimentation is involved in the process of institution creation. The key lies in 
the perspective which regards political action as driven by the interests of individual actors, 
meaning that “politics is usually about who gets what, when, where and how.”
18 As an actor-
centered and rationalist approach, the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ theory conceptualizes the 
political economy as an environment populated with entrepreneurial actors seeking to advance 
their interests as they construe them and looking for ways to make institutions work for them.    
The notion of complementarity implies that it is not possible for a capitalist regime to easily 
switch from one system to the other. Self-reinforcing differences imply diversity in forms of 
capitalism, which represent a so-called comparative institutional advantage of nations: LMEs 
exhibit different patterns of innovation and technological change as well as a different industrial 
specialization compared to their CME counterparts. LMEs have a comparative advantage in 
industries where competitiveness is based on a firm’s ability to quickly adapt to changing market 
conditions. Radical innovation patterns prevail. CMEs, on the other hand, have their competitive 
                                                 
16 Cp. HALL (2005), p. 373.  
17 Cp. CROUCH ET AL. (2005). 
18 HALL (2005), p. 376. 
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advantage in industries where success is based on building up cumulative knowledge and 
company-specific skills. Incremental innovation prevails in this system.
19  
 
Comparative institutional advantage 
Within the theoretic framework of the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ literature, the concept of 
comparative institutional advantage plays a key role. The concept is thought to complement and 
extend the theory of comparative economic advantage. The latter focuses on the relative 
endowment of input factors (e.g. land, labor, capital) and proposes that trade will lead that 
country to specialize in the production of goods that uses its most abundant factors most 
intensively.
20 This theory has its limits in explaining e.g. intra-industry trade and the causes and 
effects of international capital movements: according to the comparative economic advantage 
theory, there is no reason for a country to import and export goods from the same industry sector. 
Further the theory does not account for the fact that international capital transfer can change 
national factor endowments in a short period of time. Here is where the concept of comparative 
institutional advantage steps in: the main idea is that the institutional matrix of a particular 
economy provides firms with advantages for engaging in specific types of activities. This is 
because the institutional support firms receive for certain activities and the institutions relevant 
for such activities are not evenly distributed across nations. According to Hall and Soskice 
(2001)
21 there is now widespread recognition among economists that the institutional matrix of a 
nation can condition rates of growth and technological progress. However, most endeavors to 
identify these institutions have focused on market relations and the legal framework and have 
neglected the non-market relations that may be equally important to explain such outcomes. 
Depending whether we analyze firm behavior in a LME or a CME, the modes of coordination 
will differ. In a CME, non-market coordination patterns will prevail. The availability of a certain 
institutional matrix hence conditions the efficiency with which a firm can perform distinct 
activities and produce certain kinds of goods and services. This means that the institutional 
matrix provides a nation with comparative advantages in particular activities. Due to 
international trade, this comparative institutional advantage will lead to patterns of distinct 
specialization across nations. One important type of comparative institutional advantage is the 
                                                 
19 Cp. MILLER (2005), p. 17. 
20 Cp. HALL/ SOSKICE (2001), p. 36. 
21 Cp. HALL/ SOSKICE (2001), p. 38. 
  10 
impact of the institutional setting on patterns of innovation: radical innovation, which brings 
about significant shifts in product lines, goods and production processes is distinguished from 
incremental innovation, characterized by gradual but small-scale improvements. These patterns 
of innovation again have an impact on what types of products and services prevail in an 
economy: Radical innovation will stimulate activity in fast-moving technology sectors with 
R&D-intensive products such as e.g. software, biotechnology and micro-electronics. Incremental 
innovation however is needed to maintain competitiveness in the production of capital goods, 
such as machine tools and consumer durables. CMEs are defined as being better in fostering 
incremental innovation, since the workforce is skilled enough to come up with such innovations 
and secure enough on their job that they do not perceive being threatened when suggesting a 
product improvement but see this rather as a duty within the dimension of their job. A CME 
provides exactly such an environment with secure employment, autonomy from close 
monitoring, and the possibility to shape the decision making in the firm. Moreover, inter-firm 
collaboration encourages both clients and suppliers to suggest improvements to products or 
production processes. In contrast to this, LMEs are said to limit firms’ capacities for incremental 
innovation but to support radical innovation patterns: Their environment is characterized by fluid 
labor markets and short job tenures that inclines an employee to focus on her own career rather 
than to advance the firm’s success by developing general industry skills. Furthermore, contract 
and anti-trust laws discourage inter-firm collaboration and hence limit the potential for 
incremental innovation to take place. Radical innovation, however, can be frequently observed in 
a LME environment: highly fluid and liberal labor markets give the opportunity to an enterprise 
that is interested in developing a completely new product to rather easily hire the necessary 
experts but also to set them free again easily in case the project fails. Inter-firm relations are 
based mostly on markets: extensive equity markets allow firms to buy themselves into new 
technology by acquiring other companies and a viable venture capital scene allows scientists to 
market their own ideas.  
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3  Institutional change and complementarity in a transition economy: the case of 
China from a ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ perspective 
Following Hall and Soskice’s concept of institutional complementarity, a qualitative analysis of 
the key institutional realms which are at the hear of the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach is 
conducted for China, in order to idnetify elements and mechanisms of complementarity. Hence, 
the subsequent discussion focuses on the financial system, industrial relations, inter-firm and 
intra-firm relations as well as the country’s education and training system. 
 
3.1  China’s financial system 
Although there is no consensus regarding the future development of China’s economic growth, 
there is widespread agreement that the financial system is one of the weak links in the economy 
and it is estimated to hamper future economic growth.
22  
 
The evolving banking sector 
On the eve of the reform process in 1978, China had only three state-owned banks.
23 Until today, 
the banking sector has remained strongly regulated with only slow opening up due to pressure 
from WTO membership. The People’s Bank of China has dominated the financial landscape for 
a long time: it controlled almost four-fifths of all deposits in banks and credit cooperatives and 
was the source of 93% of all loans granted by financial institutions.
24 It simultaneously served as 
the country’s central bank, regulating money supply and interest rates as well as managing and 
supervising all other institutions of the financial system. This type of monobank system was 
typical in many centrally planned economies.  
In the course of the reform process, China’s financial system grew more complex. New banks as 
well as non-bank financial institutions emerged, but competition remained weak, because, e.g., 
interest rates remained centrally regulated. However, since these new institutions were usually 
not required to grant loans to money-losing SOEs, their financial strength and health grew 
stronger rather quickly. These new organizations have thus played a key role in making the 
                                                 
22 Cp. ALLEN/ JUN/ QIAN (2005a), p. 15, LARDY (2000). 
23 The People’s Bank of China, the Bank of China, and the Construction Bank of China. 
24 Cp. LARDY (1998), p. 61. 
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allocation of capital more efficient – a central problem of China’s financial system that prevails 
to some extent until today.  
The structure of China’s banking sector, dominated by four large state-owned banks, implies that 
the degree of competition is extremely low. The industry concentration ratio, however, has been 
dropping sharply since 1997 from about 92% to about 51% in 2001 after many non-state banks 
and intermediaries entered the market.
25 The most important problem for the whole financial 
system is however the amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) within the state-owned banks. In 
the context of institutional complementarity, it is important to recognize that most of China’s 
NPLs were not inherited from the pre-reform era, but created after the reform actually began. 
They can be seen as a by-product of China’s strategy choice of gradualism for its economic 
transition to a market economy.
26 Instead of introducing hard budget contraints for SOEs 
triggering a short-term increase in unemployment and a decline in output due to “big-bang” 
restructuring efforts, the state provided various kinds of subsidies to ensure that virtually all 
firms were able to stay in business.
27 Gradual reform mainly took the form of easing the 
constraints faced by a market-based non-state sector rather than imposing market discipline on 
SOEs in an ad-hoc style. To a large extent, the build-up of NPLs in the financial system mirrors 
the success of economic reforms in other areas: Through price reforms, e.g., SOEs no longer had 
access to agricultural products and raw materials below the market price. Also the elimination of 
the two-tier pricing system of foreign exchange in 1994 put an end to the preferential treatment 
of SOEs that had granted them privileged access to foreign exchange. In addition, many reform 
$measures that needed to be implemented after WTO accession, such as the reduction of the 
number of commodities requiring import licenses once used to ensure SOEs’ access to scarce 
commodities lead to an equal treatment of private sector firms and SOEs in many areas. In order 
to manage this transition for SOEs, the preferential access to loans from state banks served as an 
important measure to prevent these companies from bankruptcy. That way, the Chinese 
government has made the transition socially less costly. However, this strategy is not without 
danger, since the growing NPLs can become one of China’s most severe problems. Reducing the 
amount of NPLs to normal levels is therefore the most important task for China’s financial 
system in the years to come. But nevertheless this precisely illustrates the Chinese government’s 
                                                 
25 Cp. ALLEN/ JUN/ QIAN (2005a), p. 17. 
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strategy of how to manage reform. Complementarity with other institutional decisions can also 
be found: government debt is comparatively low, which implies that the Chinese state budget can 
afford the high level of NPLs relatively well. Exhibit 1 compares the ratio (NPLs + Government 
Debt)/GDP among China, Japan, South Korea and the US for the period 1997-2002. The lower 
the ratio (resulting from low NPLs, low government debt, or both), the easier it is for the 
government to assume the NPLs.
28 However, if the NPLs were to be depreciated from the banks’ 
balance sheets (as the WTO actually postulates), the banks would be estimated to go bankrupt.  
 
China’s stock market development 
Since their inception in 1990 China’s domestic stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), have seen fast growth, but they cannot yet be 
considered efficient since prices and investors’ behavior are not fully driven by fundamental 
values of listed firms. Exhibit 2 shows that China’s stock exchanges have the highest turnover 
velocity
29 among the world’s largest exchanges, namely 224.2% in 2002.
30 China’s stock market 
movements show patterns common to developing economies: due to poor protection of minority 
investors and other imperfect market regulations stock prices move more synchronously. 
However, China has performed better than most other transition countries when standard 
measures for stock market performance are analyzed, even though the country has only slowly 
developed a legal framework for stock markets and has a weak law enforcement record.
31 Given 
this seeming contradiction, there must have been other governance institutions that stepped in as 
a substitute for this lack of formal law and law enforcement and that were thus complementary to 
the wider institutional transition context which the set-up of the stock market took place in. In 
the beginning phase, China had primarily relied on an administrative governance system built 
around the quota system that in turn relied on the decentralized structure of the Chinese 
administration.
32  This quota system served two important functions and shall be briefly 
introduced here: it helped mitigate the serious information problems that both investors and 
regulators faced in China and it helped local bureaucrats to select viable companies at the IPO 
                                                 
28 Cp. ALLEN/ JUN/ QIAN (2005a), p. 22. 
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30 Cp. ALLEN/ JUN/ QIAN (2005a), p. 25. 
31 Cp. PISTOR/ XU (2005), p. 185. 
32 Cp. QIAN/ XU (1993), pp 40 – 44.  
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stage. Quotas had been the basic feature of economic management and regulation in China 
before and during the transition period. The system was particularly designed to allocate critical 
resources among regions, such as credits or energy.
33 The annual quota for a region, i.e. the 
amount of shares firms were allowed to issue to the public, was set in an intense bargaining 
process between central and regional authorities. The primary purpose of the central government 
to adapt the quota system to the stock market was to gain and maintain control over its size and 
stability. In practical application however, it went far beyond that: Due to regional competition, 
it fostered a selection and information collection process that facilitated the market development 
during the start-up period, since the quotas were set by the central authority drawing on the 
quality of the companies selected and handed in for assessment by the regional governments. 
Regions that performed well were rewarded by the CSRC and those whose companies failed or 
underperformed were punished. Regions thus had an incentive to collect and reveal critical 
information about the real quality of companies in their area. Based on their assessment, the 
CSRC then pre-selected companies that were allowed to enter the formal approval process. The 
quota system has significantly raised disclosure levels and transparency – critical factors for a 
functioning stock market. Of course the system with its inherent institutions is not built for the 
long-run but must be seen as a transitional institution. Today, China has already started to 
abandon the system and to “grow out of” the quota system.
34 China is now strengthening its legal 
infrastructure and enforcement mechanisms.
35 One major area of concern, however, is the 
reliability of firm-specific information as intermediaries capable of verifying information have 
only begun to emerge. Chinese financial reporting, accounting practices and disclosure are 
currently oriented to primarily meet the information requirements of taxation authorities and not 
those of investors.
36 A separate reporting for tax and accounting purposes does not exist. The 
consequence is that tax laws determine how accounting is carried out in China. This system 
therefore paradoxically constitutes a high incentive for Chinese companies to use loopholes in 
the system and to modify information.
37 This shows that the Chinese accounting practices are 
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still far away to fulfill the qualitative characteristics of good corporate accounting as formulated 
by the FASB.  
In a ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ context it seems too early to derive a final judgment as to whether 
the Chinese stock market takes the path of a liberal or coordinated economy. Of course the low 
liquidity level and its still low importance as a means to finance companies point into the 
direction of a CME approach. However, the stock market is growing at a significant pace and its 
operation is maturing but it remains a young institution that still needs to take shape. 
 
Corporate Governance in China 
A major building block of a financial system is a country’s corporate governance structure. It 
describes the power-relationships between major stakeholders of an economy and therefore 
serves as an important and insightful domain within a ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ analysis. There 
are two stylized types: insider control systems that prevail in CMEs (e.g. the “Deutschland AG” 
in Germany) and outsider control systems that are common for LMEs.
38  
Banks are important players in corporate governance and enterprise monitoring. As shown in the 
preceding discussion, the banking system in China is still the most important external source of 
financing of enterprises.
39 Therefore, the relationships between banks and enterprises are 
naturally close. The banking reform in China goes hand in hand with enterprise reform and both 
depend on each other. Since banks have a monitoring capacity, they constitute an important 
leverage for a functioning corporate governance environment: they can play an important role to 
counterbalance insiders on the one hand and counter possible abuse of power by holding 
companies on the other.
40 However, a precondition for banks to take major roles in corporate 
governance in China is that they must have the capability and the incentives to do so. China’s 
banking system is however still characterized by the high share of NPLs.
41 This accumulation of 
bad debt is mainly due to the fact that the banking system fails to efficiently allocate financial 
resources and to monitor enterprises.
42 Banks in China are still not fully market oriented and are 
subject to political influence when it comes to allocating credits.
43 This shows that the banking 
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system in China is still not fully able to perform needed tasks in enterprise reform and cannot 
sufficiently play its vital role in corporate governance.  
The development of corporate governance standards is also closely linked to the degree of 
development of the stock market, because an efficient stock market would reward better 
corporate governance with lower funding costs. However, despite its impressive development 
during the last ten years, Chinese stock markets are not yet capable of promoting good corporate 
governance, because China’s financial markets do not yet reward better and more transparent 
companies with lower-cost funds.
44 However, as the preceding section on the stock market has 
shown, there is control by a set of transitional institutions that have helped the stock market to 
grow. But they are hardly effcient: A research conducted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange found, 
e.g., a number of disclosure problems among Chinese listed companies. Especially the disclosure 
of related party transactions is a major concern, since these transactions are often neither 
disclosed fully nor timely. The survey also found that the use of funds raised from the public is 
not fully disclosed by many corporations and discrepancies between anticipated profits and 
actual net income are only insufficiently explained. This poor disclosure is also due to the poor 
quality of audits by certified public accountants in China.
45 Confusion often arises due to the fact 
that the government does not prescribe a specific accounting standard. This hampers clear 
comparability among the different listed companies. In addition to inadequate disclosure, 
selective disclosure is an important problem given the underdeveloped and speculative nature of 
Chinese capital markets.
46 Companies listed on the “A share market” are e.g. not required to 
distribute financial reports to shareholders. It has therefore often been the case that selectively 
disclosed information has resulted in high share price changes or unusually high trading 
volumes, mostly to the disadvantage of small and medium shareholders. The main reason for 
these problems can be found in deficient law enforcement. Both private enforcement of investor 
rights and public enforcement of contractual disputes have been extremely weak in China. This 
underperformance leads to a vicious circle: the weak legal system firstly limits the scope of 
corporate governance practices a firm can follow; and secondly it predetermines the set of 
                                                 
44 Cp. TENEV/ ZHANG/ BREFORT (2002), p. 118. 
45 Cp. LIN (2004), pp. 10, 11. 
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regulatory frameworks that China can choose from. Other institutions can surely adapt to some 
extent but not enough to offset weak legal protection.
47  
It is interesting to note though, that China’s regulatory structures are formally based on the 
Anglo-American corporate governance system and are hence oriented towards a LME concept: 
The board of directors is the first method that shareholders have to control managers and ensure 
the company is run in their interest.
48  However, everyday practice in China can differ quite 
substantially from the formal structure. The concept of socialist “public” ownership is still 
prevalent in the minds of both government officials and managers. A major problem for the 
functioning of Chinese boards is the high degree of insiders: Chinese reality shows that large 
shareholders nominate new directors in 57% of listed companies; the board of directors does so 
in 34% of companies, the chair of the board in 6% and existing directors in 3% of companies. In 
order to strengthen the independence of the board of directors, the CSRC issued guidelines for 
establishing an independent board of directors in listed companies in August 2001. But also 
independent directors face many obstacles and problems while exercising their duties. Especially 
the lack of a strong legal backing as well as a lack of incentives often leads to results of inferior 
quality.  
Another important institution within corporate governance is the board of supervisors. Here, the 
Chinese case paints a very different picture compared to the Anglo-American approach just 
presented in the context of the board of directors. It could best be described as a mixture of a 
German supervisory committee and China’s traditional concept of employees as “masters of 
enterprise.”
49 But the establishment of the supervisory board is not based on the same social and 
philosophical considerations that led to the German system due to the difference in historical 
development.
50 The Company Law does not specify how many shareholder’s representatives and 
how many employees’ representatives shall set up the board of supervisors but leaves this 
decision to the individual company. Surveys have shown that given the SOEs tradition and 
history, the ratio is about 50/50.
51 Leaders of party committees, however, tend to hold key 
positions such as chairs and vice chairs. Unions are not represented to a significant extent. The 
responsibilities of the supervisory board mainly include the following: (a) to examine the 
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company’s affairs; (b) to supervise directors and managers to see whether they violate laws or 
regulations; (c) to require directors or managers to correct actions that have harmed the interests 
of the company; (d) to propose to hold extraordinary shareholder’s general meetings.
52 Given its 
limited function and rather fuzzy mode of operation, the supervisory board cannot be expected to 
play an effective role. But it must be noted that the general philosophy behind this concept 
diverts significantly from a liberal approach as practiced in the US or UK. The high degree of 
coordination and the resemblance to the German model in many aspects leads to the conclusion 
that China might be trying to follow a CME path rather than that of LMEs. The picture however, 
is very mixed and ambiguous in the domain of corporate governance.  
 
Chinese corporate governance as a transitional institution 
The starting point for developing corporate governance standards in China is very different from 
the starting point in Europe or North America: judicial systems, capital markets, institutional 
investors are far less developed. Getting companies to comply with new rules will thus take time. 
Given the vast differences in ownership structures, business practices and enforcement 
capabilities, merely adopting new requirements en masse from North America or Western 
Europe would be a mistake.
53 China must therefore develop its own institutional mix that leads 
to wealth-enhancing exchange processes. However, the appropriate institutional mix will not 
arise automatically. This means that the state needs to play a key role in “defining the rules of the 
game”. The development of corporate governance is to be seen as one important field embedded 
in a whole set of institutions which needs to be further developed.
54 In order to create a wealth-
enhancing economic foundation, secure property rights and an open market structure must be 
enforced,
55 since “secure property rights give rise to (a) technological progress and (b) flexible 
organizational structures, and appropriate economic institutions maintain (c) open markets and 
(d) the constant value of money through competition between money issuing authorities.”
56 
Corporate governance reform is therefore a long journey in China. The continued opening up of 
markets to competition is essential to reduce the incentives for (state-) ownership concentration 
and therefore to increase the incentives for dispersed shareholding, risk diversification at the 
                                                 
52 Cp. TAM (1999), p. 86. 
53 cp. BARTON/ COOMBES/ WONG (2004), p. 56. 
54 cp. MURREL (2003), pp. 28 et sqq.  
55 cp. MANTZAVINOS (2001), p. 240. 
56 MANTZAVINOS (2001), p. 240. 
  19 
level of individual or institutional wealth holders, and hence for improved governance practice. 
Given the size of the country and the different institutional constraints that have evolved over 
time, reforming corporate governance should not follow a single model but allow for diversity. 
“In this sense, the most dangerous reform strategy is to insist on a single organizational model 
for all enterprises in the country.”
57 As of today, the situation in China thus paints a very 
ambiguous picture that is highly inconsistent with the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ concept. 
German-style coordinated components have been identified as well as liberal elements: The 
banking system is comparable to the main-bank system in Japan and therefore close to a CME 
concept.
58 However, the monitoring capability of Chinese banks is still very low. Further reform 
measures will therefore give a better insight into where the banking system is heading. Other 
institutions such as the general meeting of shareholders described as the “organ of power” face a 
similar problem of ambiguity since codified law often differs substantially from real practice. 
The fact that large shareholders dominate, relationships matter, and an absence of dispersed 
ownership structures are strong indicators for a CME environment. The same holds for the board 
of supervisors that draws on the German model. On the other hand the analysis has shown that 
China’s regulatory structures are based on the Anglo-American corporate governance system. 
This fact serves as a strong indicator that China is oriented towards a LME concept.  
To summarize, it can be said that with a stock market still in its infancy and an inefficient 
banking sector and a very ambiguous picture in the domain of corporate governance, the Chinese 
financial system can hardly be categorized within the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ framework. 
China seems to follow neither a pure shareholder nor a pure stakeholder approach. While this 
configuration can be efficient during the transition process, it could disappear as the economy 
matures. Before coming to a final conclusion on the issue of complementarity within the whole 
system, the remaining other institutional areas shall be analyzed. 
 
3.2  Industrial relations in China 
Since the beginning of reforms China’s labor force has experienced fundamental 
transformations. At the beginning, the majority of the work force was employed by SOEs or 
rural communes which guaranteed life-long employment, which led to low productivity due to 
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overstaffing and shirking. Reform implied powerful changes in the distribution of jobs: By the 
end of the 1990s, about one third of the rural labor force had moved into non-farm activities and 
about three fifths of the urban work force had found employment outside the state sector, e.g., in 
private enterprises and joint venture companies.
59 Under socialist central planning, government 
agencies fiercely controlled the job market, and job changes were usually prohibited. Since 1978 
a series of deregulatory reforms have established a more liberal labor market. However, the state 
administration continues to play an important role, and many policies as well as existing 
institutions still prevent the labor market from operating efficiently. Managing labor market 
transition is one of the most challenging tasks for the Chinese government, and the way in which 
regulations and other institutions evolve in response to these challenges shall be briefly 
discussed, in order to determine which development path China’s labor market is following. 
The first wave of liberalization took place in the commodity and goods markets before the labor 
market was touched in China’s urban areas.
60 Labor allocation used to be conducted by labor 
bureaux: Job eligibility was restricted to residents in possession of a “hukou” (i.e. a local 
residence permit), which entitled them to housing, food subsidy, schooling as well as retirement 
and health benefits. Wages were centrally determined according to a centrally administered wage 
grid, and the job was guaranteed for a life-time. The wage grid mainly valued ‘formal’ 
qualification such as education and years of experience and largely ignored an individual’s real 
labor productivity. These institutional arrangements imposed severe limitations on job mobility 
and flexibility and led to inefficient solutions. 
When describing the reforms, one has to bear in mind that reform in the form of laws and 
regulations can often substantially differ from reality due to the severe deficiencies in law 
enforcement.
61 A turning point in the reform process was the introduction of labor contracts in 
1986: This new system denoted that enterprises were only responsible to workers for as long as 
the contract specified and were no longer required to continue to pay workers a salary after the 
contract had expired. The new Enterprise Law stated that “the enterprise shall have the right to 
employ or dismiss its staff members and workers in accordance with the provisions of the State 
Council.”
62 This statement can be interpreted as a radical shift in the context of China’s recent 
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institutional history. Other institutional changes complemented this step, such as the introduction 
of unemployment and social security funds. By 1995, 93% of all SOE employees were under 
contract.
63 The labor contract system thus represents a relatively flexible labor allocation 
mechanism compared to the rigid pre-reform arrangement. However, in comparison to a free 
labor market that one would find in a LME, the flexibility of the contract system was still limited 
in many ways. Severe restrictions, e.g., remained in regional mobility and, although management 
had gotten more control over recruitment, it was still bound to the state labor plans and could not 
simply dismiss employees because of overstaffing until the early 1990s.
64. Regulations in this 
respect have become much more relaxed, but liberal hiring and firing has nevertheless not 
become common practice. Hence, a liberal labor market in the sense of a LME does not exist in 
China. Another factor that prevents further liberalized structures can be found in the belief 
systems of many Chinese managers: They choose not to dismiss employees due to their 
conviction that the company is a kind of “socio-political community”. Managers are responsible 
for that community and are judged by both their superiors and their subordinates on their success 
in all areas regarding community welfare, including employment.
65 
The presented findings show that in the domain of labor relations, China has also chosen a 
gradual transition strategy: Firms take a more market-oriented approach in their labor relations, 
but the rank of a firm’s governing organizations remains important during the transition 
process.
66 Also, conceptions of loyalty and fairness maintain clientelist relationships. These pre-
reform ideologies continue to play a crucial role in the decision making of managers in reform-
era China. Hence, the new labor system must be still regarded as an institution in transition, 
because the socialist ideology of supporting workers still persists in many companies. A high 
degree of coordination activities exist coming from two main sources: First, the state still exerts 
power on decision making, and, secondly, the Chinese belief system has an important effect for 
the management of labor relations. It can be concluded that the Chinese labor market exhibits 
many characteristics of a CME model. 
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3.3  Inter-firm relations and R&D and technology transfer 
The preceding discussion on corporate governance closely links with the subject of inter-firm 
relations. In CMEs, where highly liquid capital markets do not exist, these relations perform a 
monitoring function. In other areas such as R&D, companies in CMEs pool resources in business 
networks, whereas firms in LMEs rely heavily on the movement of scientific personnel across 
companies through a fluid labor market. 
Inter-organizational business networks exist in order to enhance the survival and capabilities of 
organizations by providing opportunities for shared learning, knowledge transfer and other 
resource exchanges. Since firms cannot generate all required resources internally, they must 
conduct exchanges with other firms or organizations. Organizational networks emerge that 
connect and transfer complementary and interdependent competencies between firms. 
Guanxi (i.e., “relationship” or “connection”) is a cultural characteristic that has powerful 
consequences for inter-personal and inter-organizational dynamics in Chinese society. Guanxi 
has been developed over many centuries in China and is embedded in every aspect of personal 
and organizational interactions. Given its strong institutional effect on firm operations in China’s 
transition economy, it is necessary to discuss implications of this phenomenon as to how it 
shapes inter-firm relations in China. Guanxi has its origins in Confucianism which fosters 
collectivism and thus the importance of networks and inter-personal relationships. It can be 
described as a form of “social capital” because it involves the exchange of social obligations. 
This reciprocal exchange of favors is essential to grow and sustain guanxi. “The rules of 
reciprocity in guanxi establish a structural constraint that curtails self-seeking opportunism and 
preserves social capital within the existing network structure.”
67 Guanxi has remained a critical 
factor in firm performance in contemporary China. It structures the pattern how a firm interacts 
with its environment and therefore has a direct influence on the flow of resources. As China 
develops further and continues its economic reform guanxi has become even more important in 
the context of managing the newly arising uncertainty. Guanxi has an impact on financial 
outcomes, market benefits and competitive advantages.
68 The underlying logic for Chinese firms 
is to utilize guanxi to manage organizational interdependence and to deal with institutional 
disadvantages and other structural weaknesses. Its effectiveness depends on its fit with 
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institutional and organizational attributes.
69 As China’s transition process has led to increased 
institutional uncertainty, firms turn closer to guanxi networks to lower their external dependence 
on key resources and to simultaneously lower their bureaucratic costs that would arise from 
internalizing operations. As a very loosely structured network, guanxi is an efficient means to 
facilitate economic exchanges. This guanxi-based “network capitalism”, however, is different to 
business networks that prevail in CMEs: Guanxi stretches out to a multitude of (often small-
scale) actors and does not tend to expand into large bureaucratic structures that would come 
about in CMEs. To overcome disadvantages from small size, Chinese businesses band together 
into clusters which are linked through flexible horizontal networks. The guanxi structure is also 
quite open to new members, as opposed to company networks, e.g., in Germany. In western 
countries, a relationship between business partners usually arises after the transaction whereas in 
China transactions often follow successful guanxi. A major concern of Chinese organizations is 
to engage in extensive networking activities through guanxi to build trust and exchange favors.
70 
Overall, the findings reflect potential synergy gains in guanxi from resource complementarity 
and lower transaction costs. In China’s transition economy with ambiguous property rights and a 
weak competition policies, guanxi provides an opportunity to increase market share through 
improved competitive positioning by collaborating with competitors and government 
authorities.
71 Firms thus establish guanxi networks to overcome strategic and institutional 
weaknesses by linking up with those agents that they are only remotely related with but that have 
strong control over key resources.
72 In conclusion, China exhibits a distinct prevalence of 
guanxi-networks in the private sector. Capitalist development in China is therefore characterized 
by a duality: On the one hand, a large state sector operates in key industries and services and 
stands under the control of the central government’s industrial policies. On the other hand, this 
state sector coexists and melds with a private sector that is structured by guanxi-networks. 
The informal institution “guanxi” deeply influences and structures economic activity in China. 
Though substantially different from Western business networks, guanxi leads to a high degree of 
coordination within the economy. This piece of evidence suggests placing China in a CME 
context rather than in a LME context. 
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Research & development, technology transfer and innovation 
At the outset of reform in 1978, China had organized and planned its R&D at the national level 
through the State Science and Technology Commission and related central government bodies. 
Research (including all creative or innovative activity) was conducted by research institutes. 
Under central planning, factories had neither a mandate nor any incentive to engage in 
innovation and change. Similarly, research institutes did not undertake any production 
activities.
73 Since 1978, profound changes in the organizational boundaries of the Chinese 
innovation system have taken place. For purposes of our ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ research focus 
it shall suffice here to limit our attention to the set-up of China’s contemporary innovation 
system structure. Today, organizations have diversified into various functional activities and the 
former dichotomy between R&D and manufacturing no longer persists. Moreover, new actors 
have entered the market, with multi-national corporations (MNCs) taking an important position. 
Today research institutes are much more responsive to down-stream problems of e.g. 
manufacturers and end-users as the government has continually cut their operating budgets. They 
now compete for resources – market coordination prevails. On the other hand, the government 
has increased its funding of basic research, allocating money to develop scientific bases and 
technical infrastructure particularly in IT and biotechnology. Another major shift addresses the 
question where R&D is carried out and by whom. Today, more and more R&D activities are co-
located with implementation and manufacturing, but plain R&D activities in universities and 
research institutes have increased even more significantly. Manufacturing firms have 
substantially increased their funding of R&D by outside research institutes, since managers 
perceive that buying or contracting for research services from outside is more cost-effective. At 
the enterprise level, R&D is primarily involved in process scale-up and other activities that are 
more related to implementation rather than to creation of new technology. The underlying 
rationale why firms in China have not become centers of innovation has been analyzed in 
empirical studies. Major reasons are e.g. a lack of qualified technical personnel and of access to 
relevant markets and technological information as well as unclear property rights.
74 Another 
major change in China’s innovation system was brought about by the entrance of MNCs and 
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their R&D centers. FDI has often led to extensive technology import, which then has been 
responsible for upgrading many of China’s key industries.
75 However, the impact of foreign 
technology might have benefited China even more, if the country’s coordination processes had 
been different: China focused more on codified technology (e.g. software, drawings, production 
lines) and not on intangible assets, such as intensive interaction and collaboration with foreign 
firms in research and problem-solving. Tacit knowledge has therefore been hardly transferred in 
China.
76  
This overview shows that economic reform during the past 25 years has substantially altered the 
structure and dynamics of China’s innovation system to more efficiency. However, also the 
innovation system in China must still be regarded as a transitional institution, since a number of 
important issues remain open: government influence remains and often leads to inadequate 
incentives affecting innovative behavior. Most importantly however, the inadequate legal 
environment with weak and ambiguous property rights cannot yet provide a reliable environment 
for inter-firm and inter-organizational relationships which is crucial in the innovation process.
77 
Liu and White (2001) state that there is even a relative decline in the tendency of organizations 
to cooperate in later stages of the innovation process. Exhibit 7 shows the development of joint 
patents in China and illustrates the described trend. In summary this shows that “organizations 
are cooperating more in the upstream stages of the technological development process, but 
cooperating less in the downstream stages as the commercial potential becomes clearer.”
78 In a 
‘Varieties of Capitalism’ context the current stage of development of China’s innovation system 
can therefore not be clearly classified either. Competition for resources and increasing market 
coordination point towards a LME approach. However, R&D still remains primarily within 
research institutes and not production companies. Many of these are influenced by the 
government, as the increased funding of basic research indicates. R&D in a ‘Varieties of 
Capitalism’ context therefore remains ambiguous.  
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3.4  Intra-firm relations 
The formal set-up of Chinese corporations and their decision making bodies including their 
(often not very efficient) system of checks and balances has already been excessively discussed 
in the chapter on corporate governance. This section now turns to another decisive factor that 
shapes intra-firm relations: corporate culture and management and leadership style in Chinese 
companies. With its unique cultural heritage, Chinese management and organization is deeply 
influenced by a collective orientation. The prevailing cultural values bring about a largely 
paternalistic approach to management, acceptance of hierarchy and the importance of 
relationships. Chinese management culture stresses human relationships and personal 
connections and trust as it is the case in inter-firm relationships.
79 Chinese entrepreneurs usually 
follow a management model that is not common in the West: “Chinese management culture 
starts with the family as a building block of society, whereas Western management culture 
typically starts with the individual and then moves to the group.”
80 This approach is rooted in the 
underlying social fabric of Chinese culture: Confucianism. This philosophy serves to maintain 
sensitivity to hierarchy and social order via micro units of society, such as families.
81 This has 
several implications for the management style found in Chinese enterprises. Chinese 
management philosophy centers on people, hence virtues such as humanity and benevolence, 
righteousness, propriety, wisdom and trustworthiness define inter-personal relationships.
82 These 
values are strongly related to the concept of non-specific behavior: a Chinese manager/ leader 
will not set out clearly-cut, specific demands, but rather pursue general guidelines and goals that 
allow the employees to often have considerable freedom for task accomplishment. These 
principles are similar to concepts of empowerment in Western cultures. Another important 
building block for inter-personal relationships is an individual’s capacity for compromise and 
maintaining a harmonious relationship with others.  
The described system is very different from what one observes in liberal market economies in 
the Anglo-American world. One major variation is the collectivist orientation of the Chinese 
culture opposed to a very individualist system pertinent in the UK or the US.
83 Exhibit 8 gives 
provides a deeper insight into the contrasting value systems of the Anglo-American and Chinese 
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cultures. Chinese management continues to be heavily influenced by cultural tradition: the 
paternalistic style of leadership remains the dominant mode of leadership in Chinese business 
and large power distance are a defining feature. This translates into centralized authority, 
hierarchical structures, as well as informal coordination and control mechanisms.
84 Especially 
SOEs exhibit highly formalized and bureaucratic structures. They are also characterized by low 
employee empowerment and decisions tend to be taken rather top-down. In contemporary China, 
management and decision making styles vary largely across the different ownership types and 
are thus certainly evolving into more diversified approaches. The described underlying “social 
fabric” however remains active in all types. Within the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ context, 
hierarchies, collectivism, and an importance of relationships are indicators for a CME 
environment.  
Traditional Chinese management stresses a control-oriented approach that features a hierarchy of 
special managerial roles, reinforced by a top-down allocation of authority in order to monitor and 
control workers and their efforts. This approach has often resulted in poor execution of firm 
strategies, low innovation and quality improvements due to a disaffected workforce. Many 
modern Chinese organizations have however broken with that traditional concept and apply 
modern employee involvement and TQM schemes. With its relatively cooperative/ collectivist 
society China would be well placed to introduce more employee involvement and some 
companies are already doing so. That way the growth of organizational knowledge could be 
enhanced and companies could strengthen their competitive position by better leveraging their 
human assets. However, as for today the discretionary power of managers has not been 
constrained significantly and they continue to take decisions based on their hierarchical level. As 
outlined in the discussion on the labor market, job tenure is elevated due to restricted labor 
mobility. This fact together with the care an employee receives by its “firm-community”, 
indicates that Chinese intra-firm relations adhere more towards a CME rather than to a LME 
approach. 
 
3.5  Education and vocational training 
The Chinese education system’s ability to produce graduates with those skills that are required 
by employers has been a wide concern. Overall, the Chinese education system stresses 
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certification in general skills rather than the acquisition of highly specialized industry- or even 
firm-specific competencies. The education system in China today finds itself between conflicting 
skill demands of the different types of enterprises that the transition era has brought about: 
traditional SOEs continue to focus rather on hard technical skills whereas new private Chinese 
enterprises as well as foreign and joint venture companies stress the importance of soft skills. 
Many SOEs are still looking for managers or technicians to work within relatively narrow 
concepts of management and tend to focus on task-oriented skills. They hence rate formal 
qualifications high, especially in science and mathematics related fields.
85  The Chinese 
education system has been catering well to this demand, since it highly values formal education 
in the sciences itself. Foreign companies and other newly founded private enterprises however 
increasingly seek graduates that are equipped with important soft skills (such as communication 
and problem solving skills, leadership and management skills etc.). Here the Chinese education 
system so far has shown a rather poor performance as curricula have not been significantly 
adapted. The system continues to cater rather well to the demands of SOEs since it had been 
geared towards exactly the needs of these traditional enterprises for the last decades. Foreign 
enterprises therefore use the education system mainly as an important selection mechanism in 
their HR strategy: they select candidates they estimate most promising and then further train their 
new recruits with tailor-made development and training programs.
86 They are usually equipped 
with the necessary resources that allow them to pursue this strategy. This does usually however 
not hold for local private enterprises that can therefore be seen to be worst off by the current 
arrangement. The system however is changing today and management education is becoming 
more wide-spread.  
In conclusion it must be said, that the Chinese education system is geared towards the provision 
of formal (especially scientific) education and that links to the industry remain weak. There is no 
‘dual-system’ as it exists in Germany that would provide for industry-specific skills. This 
situation indicates that China is following – at least for the time being – rather the liberal path 
within the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ framework by Hall and Soskice in the domain of formal 
education. 
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The significant changes in China’s advancing economy have also had a major impact on the 
Chinese vocational education and training (VET) system. The rapid growth and the increasing 
need for improved competitiveness have put pressure on the VET system to create a skilled 
workforce. New patterns of employment, such as jobs provided by foreign companies and the 
opportunity for self-employment have influenced the aspirations of young people towards VET. 
Also in order to reach sustained economic development, China needs to invest in its human 
capital stock. Similar to most countries in the world, formal education and vocational training are 
two separate systems that lead to two different career prospects. Vocational training is provided 
from two standard sources: VET institutions and employing organizations (state-owned, 
collectively-owned, and private firms). Training programs in vocational schools or technical 
colleges usually take two to three years and focus on technical/ vocational competency training 
and usually have only little theoretical elements in their curricula. There exist three types of 
institutions: the first is technical colleges that are directly controlled by regional/ local 
authorities. Secondly, there are technical schools established by the large SOEs and industrial 
departments that are accountable to the Ministry of Labor. These schools mainly focus on 
teaching technical skills for manufactories. Thirdly, there are institutions that were turned into 
vocational schools during the reform program of the secondary school system in the 1980s. It 
was usually poor performers (relatively speaking) that were transformed into vocational schools, 
since students from these schools had only little chance to proceed to university. Through the 
new system, these students should be given general occupational skills preparing them for jobs in 
the light manufacturing or services sectors, such as tailoring, equipment maintenance and 
cooking. Under the command economy, VET was centrally organized and catered to the needs of 
the large SOEs. During the second stage of China’s economic reform however, this control was 
loosened and a broad variety of private training institutions emerged with a peak in 1995. Since 
then a process of consolidation has taken place.  
Enterprise training is the other important source of skill training in China. The ‘Reform and 
Development Plan for Education in China’, issued by the State Council in 1993, stresses that 
continuous education and training on-the-job shall be the main methods for adult education in the 
country.
87 The Labor Law of China (1995) specifies further that “an employer shall establish a 
job training system, set aside funds for job training and use them according to the regulations of 
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the State, so as to be able to train its employees systematically in the light of the 
circumstances.”
88 1996 vocational training had for the first time been given a separate piece of 
legislation: the ‘Vocational Education Law of China’. It specifies the government’s 
responsibility to implement vocational training schemes nation-wide. However also in this 
domain, law enforcement is an issue and China lacks behind its ambitious plans in many regions 
that give VET only low priority. Despite the fact that there are no detailed statistics to reflect a 
true and fair view of China’s current VET situation, different studies do however provide 
insights into the generate state: Cooke (2005) summarizes the situation and provides data that 
proves that VET has not yet been widely established (see appendix 11 for precise figures). This 
shows, that VET is still in its infancy in China and the country is increasingly looking abroad to 
identify possible training schemes that could fit its own needs. For example the National 
Vocational Qualifications (NVQs) and General Vocational Qualifications (GNVQs)
89 system in 
the UK were considered as viable options.
90 However, the “dual system” of Germany was 
acknowledged to be the best model and some large cities have set up VET centers to experiment 
with the model. Already in the early 1980s 32 Sino-German training centers had been established 
in the country. So far, the German dual system has however proved to be too expensive and also 
the single-discipline nature of trainers/ teachers has made it difficult to implement the system.  
From this the conclusion follows that VET is still a transitional institution in its infancy. 
Currently, most training schemes offer general skills training, as do their counterparts in the UK 
or US. This fact suggests that China is about to adopt a LME approach. From the desire to 
implement the German dual system one can however conclude that China has acknowledged the 
advantages such a system would have in its institutional context and is eager to implement it. 
This suggests that China is thriving to follow a CME approach, however so far lacks the 
resources to do so in a VET context.  
 
3.6  Institutional complementarities in China’s economic system 
The ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach postulates that only a pure CME or LME configuration is 
stable, efficient, and successful in the long-run. Other cases falling in between are supposed to be 
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subject to lower growth and more inefficiency. The ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ analysis of the 
Chinese case however generates roughly the following picture: 
 
Industrial Relations




















China clearly exhibits an ambiguous case that neither adheres fully to one or the other ‘Varieties 
of Capitalism’ regime. It seems though that there is a strong tendency towards a CME 
configuration. However, one major institutional element cannot be categorized, namely the 
financial system: high ownership concentration and Anglo-American regulatory structures on the 
one hand and a German-style board of supervisors, a focus on relationships, and a high degree of 
insiders on the other hand. Industrial relations as well as inter-firm and intra-firm relations point 
more to a CME model with clientelist relationships in the labor market, influential unions, the 
importance of “guanxi”, government involvement and a collectivist culture. The education and 
training sector on the other hand focuses on general skills and can be described as rather liberal.  
According to the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ framework, the Chinese institutional configuration 
should not be successful and also not sustainable in the future. The past 25 years of impressive 
economic growth however speak a very different language and also the current upward trend of 
the economy opposes this ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ implication.
91 It must therefore be concluded 
that the static ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach falls short when applied within a transition 
context. It cannot fully explain the dynamics of an economic transition. The following chapter 
will therefore outline major shortcomings of the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach within a 
transition context. 
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The sustainable success of China’s gradual reform indicates that the dynamic configuration of 
transitional institutions is nevertheless relatively efficient. However, this does not imply that the 
current institutional configuration is stable. Possibly, it will vanish at a later stage and transform 
into a different one as the economy matures. The notion of complementarity within the Chinese 
system can be outlined drawing on several examples: 
Given the mentioned problems in the legal domain, the financial system has produced striking 
characteristics: The quota system applied to the stock-market has raised transparency and 
disclosure levels significantly. A positive-selection of qualitative companies was induced which 
led to a performing stock-market. The quota system has thus raised the efficiency of the stock 
market – hence, both institutions seem complementary. Weak competition policies and 
ambiguous property rights – another set of institutions that exhibits major deficiencies if 
analyzed from an “advanced capitalism” perspective – are met by a sophisticated “social 
software”: guanxi. By collaborating in densely knit networks, e.g., with competitors and 
government authorities, a firm improves its competitive positioning and that way overcomes 
institutional weaknesses. The fact that R&D is carried out by research organizations or by 
individual companies that might cooperate with a small number of research institutes and hence 
do not create combined inter-firm and inter-industry research networks is in line with the 
‘Varieties of Capitalism’ assumptions, given the focus on general knowledge as compared to 
industry-specific skills in the education and vocational training sector. Non-market coordination 
in industrial relations gives rise to non market coordination in both inter-firm and intra-firm 
relations. China has found very non-standard institutions to support its growth.
92 The degree of 
complementarity can be seen as high though and serves as a reference point to explain the 
county’s economic success. 
 
4  Limits of the Varieties of Capitalism approach in analyzing China 
The focus on the firm as the center of analysis in the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ concept implies 
that the state as a unitary actor in the economic system does not qualify as an explanatory 
variable as to how institutions emerge and change. Hall and Soskice (2001) explain that the 
‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach is actor-centered, which is to say that the political economy is 
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understood as a “terrain populated by multiple actors, each of whom seeks to advance his 
interests in a rational way in strategic interaction with others.”
93 Hall and Soskice further explain 
that it is companies that are the “key agents of adjustment in the face of technological change or 
international competition whose activities aggregate into overall levels of economic 
performance.”
94 Here the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ theory takes a democratic polity as a given – 
as it is the case in all market economies in the developed world with their multi-party political 
systems and history of coalition politics. Economic policy is explained as the outcome of a 
bargaining process among different actors that may be individuals, firms, producer groups, or 
governments; institutions then emerge and change as the product of compromise between those 
socio-political groups. The ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ model claims that there are two static 
equilibriums (either LME or CME). It hence fails to capture the political dynamics of the 
Chinese situation. As the discussion in the preceding chapters has shown, Chinese firms today 
still lack the high degree of autonomy assumed by the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach and do 
therefore not play the central role in economic policy making. The ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ 
analyses underestimate the importance of political factors, in particular the influential role of the 
CCP
95, in China’s economic transition and reform process. Individual politicians have also 
played an important role in shaping the set-up of the economy. In 1978 it was for example Deng 
Xiaoping who had emerged as the paramount leader and who successfully initiated the reform 
process by bringing reluctant and skeptical party bureaucrats in line. Also the strong leadership 
ability of China’s premier Zhu Rongji two decades later can serve as such an example when he 
pushed through China’s WTO accession despite severe political opposition within the country.
96 
Post-Washington-consensus institutional economics literature on post-socialist transitions has 
pointed to the importance of the state in the transition process. Russia’s failure to successfully 
transform its economy is today widely attributed to a lack of state capacity.
97 In contrast, China 
is typically considered an example of effective (at least in comparative terms to other transition 
economies) state governance. The CCP admits that it did not have a master plan for reform. 
China has chosen a gradual and incremental reform towards to the market economy during which 
the CCP had continued to exercise guidance over the direction of the reforms. The Chinese 
                                                 
93 Cp. HALL/ SOSKICE (2001), p. 6. 
94 Cp. HALL/ SOSKICE (2001), p. 6. 
95 Cp. MCMILLAN/ NAUGHTON (1992). 
96 Cp. BRESLIN (2004), pp. 17 – 19. 
97 Cp. BLANCHARD/ SHLEIFER (2001). 
  34 
government did not adopt a laissez-faire approach to the establishment of complimentary 
institutions to support market operations.  
The ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ analysis does nevertheless offer valuable insights that justify its 
application to China’s transition economy. Despite its orientation towards mature capitalist 
economies, the Chinese case also confirms the validity of the concept of institutional 
complementarities as an integral component of efficient market operations. This assessment, 
however, does not explain why China, a Confucian culture, would opt for either a LME or CME 
style capitalism. China challenges the conviction of the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach and 
economic theory in general as it shows that economic behavior is embedded in a specific social, 
cultural, and historical context.
98 The emphasis of the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ theory on 
economic factors as primary determinants in policy decisions and institution building does 
however not capture the complexity of the Chinese political environment. The CCP’s reform 
strategy has been shaped by the interaction of economic and political factors, including external 
demands imposed from abroad. 
The Chinese case has shown that economic reform and transformation would be ineffective if the 
appropriate institutional foundation was absent. There is an emerging consensus in economics 
that effective governance and institutional change are key factors for economic performance. Not 
a minimal state, but a state that is capable of formulating, implementing, and enforcing reforms 
takes on a crucial role in the transition process. The role of the state in Chinese – or more broadly 
in East Asian – development has been discussed widely in the literature and the 1990s saw two 
divergent theories competing with each other: the market-friendly view and the developmental-
state view.
99 The first view expresses “that the state should confine its economic activity only to 
fostering market coordination, while the developmental-state view asserts that the state can be an 
important substitute […] for market coordination which often fails at the developmental stage of 
the economy.”
100 Hence, either the market or the state solves resource allocation problems and 
market failures. However, as the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ discussion in the preceding chapters 
has shown that coordination problems are of a broader and more general dimension than what 
the simple notion of market failure indicates: in resolving coordination problems, many different 
institutions other than markets evolve, such as the set-up of the financial system, industrial 
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relations or vocational training to name only a few. The main role of the Chinese state has not 
been in directly intervening in resource allocation (bar certain examples) but rather in developing 
those institutions and interacting with them itself. The government itself is an agent that is 
constrained in its own capacity to process information and has its own interests. It can therefore 
not be seen as a neutral body that steps in to correct private coordination failures but must be 
seen as an endogenous agent itself. Here the firm-centered view of the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ 
concept falls short. Aoki emphasizes a third view that shall be taken as the framework of analysis 
here: the market-enhancing view. Here, the government and the market are not regarded as two 
mutually exclusive substitutes, the role of the government policy is examined to facilitate or 
complement private-sector coordination.
101 One premise inherent to this view is that private-
sector institutions are seen to have important comparative advantages vis-à-vis the government, 
in particular in their ability to provide appropriate incentives and to process locally available 
information. However, it is acknowledged that the capabilities of the private sector are more 
limited in a developing economy like China.
102 “The market-enhancing view thus stresses the 
mechanisms whereby government policy is directed at improving the ability of the private sector 
to solve coordination problems and overcome other market imperfections.”
103  From this 
perspective it is thus not the government’s responsibility to solve a specific coordination problem 
but rather to facilitate the development of private-sector institutions. Over time the locus of 
coordination dynamically moves further to the private sector as it acquires more and more 
capabilities. A study on China’s institutional reform process must take this aspect into account 
and therefore focus on governance structures and their ability to foster private-sector 
coordination. China has managed to gradually create such a market-enhancing governance 
structure (MEGS) – this dimension must therefore be incorporated into the discussion of China’s 
transition process. Governance is defined as “the capacity of a country’s institutional matrix (in 
which individual actors, firms, social groups, civic organizations, and policy makers interact with 
each other) to implement and enforce market-oriented public policies and institutions, and to 
improve private sector coordination.”
104 The state as a facilitator of private sector coordination 
does not exist within the narrow scope of the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ framework. At the end of 
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the transition process, coordination will surely also be anchored within the private realm as it is 
the case in advanced economies already today. The ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach does 
however not account for this dynamic change in coordination patterns but presumes a stable state 
to already exist at the outset of the analysis. This is a major shortcoming of the approach and 
makes its validity questionable within a transition context. The state has thus played an important 
role in China’s economic transition and must be included in any analysis. 
 
5  China on the way towards a ‘hybrid capitalism’ 
China’s systemic transformation differs in many important ways from the experience in CEE
105 
and the CIS. Especially their starting conditions were very dissimilar: China was characterized 
by its large and mainly poor agricultural sector, whereas transition economies especially in the 
CEE were already industry based. Although being a centralized state, China’s more decentralized 
planning system had been in place early on, as the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution had 
damaged the reputation of central planning and substantially weakened the government 
bureaucracy and its vested interests.
106 A striking insight from China’s transition is that system 
change from a planned to a market system occurred without a political revolution. If China hence 
completes its transition, it will be the first country under a communist leadership to do so. 
China’s strategy of experimentation has shown that there is more than one path towards 
successful transition. The main lesson from the Chinese case however is that considerable 
growth is possible with “sensible but not perfect institutions”, and that transitional institutions 
can be more effective and efficient than “best practice blueprint institutions” imported from other 
countries for a certain period of time due to the second-best principle: removing one distortion 
may be counterproductive in the presence of another distortion.
107 For example, when CEE 
countries and the former Soviet Union embarked on their transition to a market economy, they 
chose the Anglo-American system as the model to follow without considering the actual 
consequences it might incur. The implementation of e.g. privatizing SOEs in these countries did 
not produce a corporate governance structure characterized by outside stockholder control as it 
was desired by policy makers that imported ‘Washington Consensus’ management practices.
108 
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Instead, it resulted in wide-spread insider control patterns and a large share of stocks was 
acquired by managers. It was the historical conditions at the outset of the reform that constrained 
the possible outcomes of the enterprise privatization process.
109  
This research paper has shown that China has embarked on a gradual and highly incremental 
transition path. China has developed basic market-supporting institutions such as the rule of law 
but is still lacking the people to operate and enforce them. Given this constraint, best practice 
institutions that require high skill levels and a variety of supporting institutions will most 
certainly not work for the time being. This implies that some existing institutions can contribute 
positively to market-oriented reform even though they will most likely eventually disappear. 
Fiscal contracting, anonymous banking, TVEs all constitute Chinese institutional innovations 
that have worked very well for a certain period of time in the Chinese context. Of course, there is 
still significant potential for improvement due to many allocative distortions.  
There are several general principles that can be derived from China’s transition experience: 
Firstly, government reform is a key component for economic reform, since if the government has 
strong positive incentives and faces hard budget constraints and competition, the resulting reform 
is productive. Moreover, the Chinese experience has shown that a reform program must be 
politically feasible, i.e. supported by the majority of people in order to be successful: a reform 
that does not create many losers in the first place will be accepted ex ante and will also be 
sustainable ex post. Furthermore, the issue of how to sequence different reform steps needs to be 
highlighted: the Chinese experience has shown that whenever it is politically feasible, “it is 
better to dismantle the existing institutions after the new ones are put in place, or allow the new 
ones emerge from the old, to avoid institutional vacuum”.
110 One such example is the slow 
phasing out of the plan track while simultaneously allowing for private businesses to emerge – 
this strategy has minimized oppositional forces and improved economic efficiency at the same 
time. Of course, China could have done even better by choosing an even better reform measures, 
but what is crucial to see is that it was most important to avoid fatal mistakes. 
A convergence of different ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ that exist worldwide – especially to the 
Walrasian model – would be difficult “because of the variance in historical conditions among 
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economies and the need for structural consistency between regulations and other institutions.”
111 
The ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach has claimed that different capitalist systems will either 
converge to a LME-equilibrium or to that of a CME. Economies that fall in between these 
categories are said to be inefficient. The preceding discussion has shown that the Chinese 
transition paints a somewhat ambiguous picture, but still appears to be relatively efficient as it 
exhibits seemingly complementary institutional configurations that are suitable for the time 
being. The dynamics of the Chinese situation are not sufficiently reflected by the theory. 
Comparative institutional economics proposes that there is diversity in economic systems on a 
global scale.
112 This study takes up this line of thought and suggests that the emerging capitalism 
in China is neither that of an LME or a CME in the sense of a pure ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ 
theory, but is of a hybrid form. Maybe the widespread tag “Capitalism with Chinese 
Characteristics” can actually serve as a term to label the emerging form of capitalism in China. 
For the time being, there is one important element in China’s socialist market economy that 
appears to be difficult to change: the Party and government bureaucracy that limit the extent to 
which free enterprises can flourish in China.
113 This situation as is not expected to change, as 
long as the economy stays on its growth track, since this situation serves as the main source of 
credibility for the central government. The government is rather popular among a large number 
of Chinese citizens. The bureaucratic behavior in China is therefore likely to remain and affect 
the way non-state enterprises can function. This dualism of the economic and the political realm 
will remain one of the characteristic features of China’s variety of capitalism.
114 
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Exhibit 1: A Comparison of the NPLs and Government Debt (%)
115 
 
Year China US Japan South Korea
1997 -- 65.6 80.0 6.5
1998 12.3 (14.4) 63.4 96.2 10.5
1999 23.7 (34.3) 61.4 107.3 20.0
2000 40.4 (65.4) 58.3 115.9 16.7
2001 39.2 (62.1) 58.4 136.5 12.7
2002 33.8 (49.1) 60.5 -- 12.0  
 
Exhibit 2 compares the ratio of (NPLs + Outstanding Government Debt)/GDP, in percentage, among China, 
Japan, the US, and South Korea for the time period 1997-2002, where the NPLs are the outstanding non-
performing loans in a country’s banking system, and outstanding government debt is the figure at the end of 
each year. The figure in brackets for China is the value of the official number for NPLs doubled. The lower the 







Exhibit 2: A Comparison of the Largest Stock Markets in the World
116 
 
Total Market Cap  Concentration Turnover Velocity
Rank Stock market (USD billion) (%) (%)
1. NYSE 9015 61.3 94.8
2. Tokyo 2095 60.6 67.9
3. Nasdaq 1994 63.1 159.8
4. London 1800 84.5 97.3
5. Euronext 1538 72.3 153.6
6. Deutsche Börse 686 72.0 125.1
7. Toronto 570 67.8 67.9
8. Swiss 547 81.2 138.6
9. Italian 477 66.1 120.7
10. China (Hong Kong) 463 83.0 39.7
11. China (domestic) 463 29.4 224.2  
 
                                                 
115 ALLEN/ QIAN/ QIAN (2005a), p. 83. 
116 ALLEN/ QIAN/ QIAN (2005a), p. 85. 
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Exhibit 3: Financial reform, debt level and governance structures in China
117 
 
A =   Pre-reform unified income and expenditure system 
B =  1978 – 80: Enterprise autonomy was expanded 
C =   1981 – 83: Experimentation with some forms of contract responsibility system 
D =   1984 – 85: Introduction of li-gai-shui (tax substituting for profit remission) 
E =   1987 – 91: Nationwide adoption of contract responsibility systems 
F =   1986: Local experiments with shareholding systems 
G =   1992 – present: Corporatisation of SOEs, shareholdings regulations, proclamation of the Company 
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1  Includes companies with foreign investment and large local private enterprises. 
2  Industrial output used as a proxy for state-owned enterprises; industry value added used as proxy for   
   local private small/medium enterprises. 
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total patents 7.836 12.902 7.576 7.762 10.898 17.256
Joint patents (% total)  6.7 4.6 6.1 5.7 3.3 2.2
Total university patents 1.214 1.774 1.078 891 854 774
Total R&D institute patents 1.705 2.558 1.514 1.485 1.387 1.472







Exhibit 8: Contrasting Anglo-American and Chinese cultures
122 
 
Anglo-American culture Chinese culture
Rational Intuitive
Inductive thinking Holistic thinking
Scientific Aesthetic
Individualistic Collectivist (family oriented)
Low power distance High power distance
Seek to reduce uncertainty Accept or tolerate uncertainty
Explicit communications Implicit communications
Function-oriented expression Relationship-oriented expression
Systematic trust Personal trust











                                                 
121 LIN/ WHITE (2001), p. 1101. 
122 Cp. CHIN/ LAU/ PUN (2000), p. 329. 
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Education level Subtotal % of population aged 6+
No schooling 89,629,436 7.75
Eliminate illiteracy class 20,767,295 1.80
Primary school 441,613,351 38.18
Junior secondary school 442,386,607 36.52
Senior secondary school 99,073,845 8.57
Technical college 39,209,614 3.39
Polytechnic college 28,985,486 2.51
University 14,150,726 1.22
Graduate student 883,933 0.08
Total population aged 6 & over 1,156,700,293 --  
 
Original source:  
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The purpose of the paper is to assess the current state of network research in China’s 
business system. Research on networks has developed significantly during the last 
decades in regards to analytic techniques, number of research projects, and accumulated 
findings. While research on networks in China has always received much attention – not 
least because networks are (still) considered one of the major forces behind the country’s 
socio-economic change – this development has also had an effect on how research on 
generic networks in China is being conducted. How Chinese networks are modelled, 
which aspects remain controversial in the academic debate, and which conclusions the 
different studies offer asks for a systematic comparison. The paper, based on an extensive 
literature research, therefore relies on a framework of theoretical concepts underlying the 
study of networks which allows a categorization of the dominant (generic) forms of 
Chinese networks as discussed in major journals. The study on the one hand is 
descriptive by filtering the diverse literature of network research on China’s business 
system. On the other hand, it serves to identify gaps and shortcomings of the current 
literature in this field pointing to future research directions. We identify four generic 
types of networks, Chinese business groups (qiyejituan), Overseas Chinese Communities, 
networks of social relations (guanxi), and Network Capitalism, as an alternative 
economic model. As the study shows, the research approaches to these networks are 
extremely diverse both in description and analysis. A focus on the identified gaps within 
each type of network and a convergence between the types of networks should yield to 
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1. Introduction  
“…if one would understand Asian economic development, 
one must first understand Asian business networks.” 
Gary G. Hamilton (Hamilton, 1996) 
 
1.1.  Network research in China 
Research on social and organizational networks in China has increased significantly 
during the 1970s when Western social sciences started to focus on the concept of 
networks. Central to the study of networks in China has always been the attempt to 
explain the uniqueness if not Chineseness of social and organizational networks. Most of 
this research had initially been dominated by anthropologists and sinologists 
(Anonymous, 1991; van der Sprenkel, 1991; Whyte, 1991; Zheng, 1991), seemingly 
defying the usual social science concepts. Only recently did network studies in China 
include social science considerations, while simultaneously general network studies 
looked for ways how to better include the notion of culture (Boisot & Child, 1988; Krug 
& Hendrischke, 2007).  
Today, network research in general as well as network research in China has reached 
a mature state (e.g. Academy of Management Journal, 1997; Acta Sociologica, 1994; 
Organization Studies, 2003; Strategic Management Journal, 2000). One indicator is the 
publication of special issues in academic journals. As calls for special issues are regularly 
expressed when a topic has attracted the attention of more than one academic field, to the 
effect that large numbers of theoretical and empirical contributions appeared in too 
dispersed location, such special issues point to the need to ‘take stock’.  
1.2.  Core question and purposes 
The purpose of this study is to offer an accurate description of the current state of 
research on generic social and organizational networks in China as published in academic 
journals. The focus will lie on networks claimed to be relevant for explaining the socio-
economic development of China, highlighting how the concept of network is being 
applied in the context of China. In the most general terms, networks here will therefore 
only be seen as “an interconnected group of people or organizations having certain connections which may be exploited to gain preferment, information, etc.” (OED, 2006). 
In a first step the development of research in this field will be described, before the focal 
findings and trends both in empirical and in theoretical research will be singled out. Such 
a procedure allows for identifying gaps and shortcoming in present research concepts and 
practices. Finally, based on these findings, directions for future research will be 
suggested.  
1.3.  Structure of the paper 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the second section, the 
research approach will be outlined. Data sources, selection mechanisms, characteristics of 
the selected publication set, and the analytical tool developed for this study will be 
described. Those publications in the list of references marked with an asterisk are 
included in the selected set of literature on networks in China. The findings are reported 
in section three, introducing the results with a broader analytical description, which 
allows constructing four distinct types of networks that dominate the literature on 
networks in China. After a summary in section four, the final section will discuss the 
overall implications of this study.  
2. Research approach  
The literature review employed a number of electronic databases searching for 
‘networks’ and ‘China’. This set of papers forms the base for clustering the different 
articles according to selected criteria. For doing so a classification scheme was developed 
including categories from other studies which have attempted to systemize network 
research while additional criteria were added when this promised more insights. In the 
following, the three main elements for the selection and analysis of the literature will be 
explained in more detail.  
2.1.  Data source 
Three sources for selecting relevant publications on networks in China were used. 
After an initial research on electronic databases, namely SSRN, JSTOR, and EBSCO, all 
studies published in academic journals that responded to the search criteria ‘China’ and 
‘network’ were identified. The initial collection required to exclude ‘irrelevant’ studies to 
  57avoid a bias toward irrelevant data that arises when the findings of all studies are equally 
weighted. The number of studies in the data set was therefore reduced by eliminating 
publications on technical and logistical networks. Articles were ordered according to the 
impact factor of the journal they have been published in.
1 Journals relevant for 
sociological studies on China were added. References of the selected number of 
publications were examined, adding frequently occurring publications that had not been 
detected before. In case of doubt, abstracts of the given papers were obtained in order to 
assess the relevance of the publication. Finally, the list was cross-checked by colleagues 
with professional experience in the field.  
The remaining set allows to assess findings in the field over time and to identify more 
recent consensus about specific research topics and approaches. It includes a total of 62 
publications that appeared between 1985 and 2006 with an increasing number in the 
years since 1995. The data set includes empirical as well as theoretical-conceptual 
contributions. 
2.2.  Classification scheme 
In order to systematically analyse the selected literature, a classification scheme was 
developed that addressed categories on network research, methodology, and lines of 
arguments. Some of the categories were derived from Borgattis’ and Fosters’ (2003) 
classification on network research in general (Borgatti & Foster, 2003). Two further 
categories aiming at discriminating the differing lines of arguments were provided by 
Krug (Krug, 2003). When required categories were adapted and extended according to 
recent developments in the field of network analysis. The remaining categories were 
added, mainly addressing methodological aspects of network research. The following 
subsections describe the classification scheme in detail and are structured as follows: 
first, categories for assessing streams of network research in the overall scientific field 
are explained (categories 1-4); second, methodological issues are discussed (categories 5-
9) followed by third, categories that assess the opinions expressed by authors regarding 
the network at stake (categories 10-13). Each paragraph discusses a separate category 
                                                   
1 The current ERIM’s journal list 2006-2008 (EJL) served as a guideline, see http://www.erim.eur.nl 
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of the results in section three will follow the same order.  
Categorizing general network research 
Borgatti et al. (2003) identify among others six areas of network research (Borgatti et 
al., 2003). ‘Social Capital’, closely related to the works of Burt and Coleman refers to the 
social value of ties, enhancing among others organizational aspects such as leadership, 
mobility, employment, individual and team performance (Burt, 1997; Coleman, 1990). 
‘Social Embeddedness’ mainly builds upon Granovetters’ notion and focuses on the 
embeddedness of economic exchanges in social networks thereby predominantly relating 
to performance benefits (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). Employing the Williamson 
notion of networks as hybrids between market and hierarchies led to the research area of 
‘Organizational Networks’ or ‘Network Organizations’. The area is conceptually divided. 
While accepting the focus on exchange among semi-autonomous organizations 
(Williamson, 1975) the question whether organizations need to convert into networks, i.e. 
organizational networks or whether organizations already constitute an assembly of 
networks, i.e. network organizations is not settled (Borgatti et al., 2003). Studies on ‘Joint 
Ventures’ and ‘Inter-firm’ alliances assess the impact of such forms of collaboration on 
firm-level outputs, more precisely organizational learning or innovation. The area of 
‘Social Cognition’ is concerned with the way networks are perceived as an entity by 
individuals members (Borgatti et al., 2003; DiMaggio, 1997) arguing that cognition of 
networks affects interaction and interaction in turn changes the network. The last area of 
network research on ‘Group Processes’ concerns the interaction of “… proximity, 
similarity of beliefs and attitudes, amount of interaction, and effective ties.” (Borgatti et 
al., 2003: 998).  
The second category regards the direction of causality. Causality offers insights into 
the understanding of research on networks and can either be directed to understanding the 
causes of networks, i.e. from where, how, and why network structures evolve, or to 
understanding the consequences of networks, i.e. what they contribute to overall 
outcome, what they offer their members, why they persist, or how they can be used as an 
(exogenous) variable for explaining other developments and trends (Borgatti et al., 2003; 
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evolutionary patterns illustrating that networks can either emerge generically, 
intentionally, or based on cultural and traditional reasons. 
The third category examines two explanatory goals in the analysis distinguishing 
between studies that try to prove homogeneity between networks or actors as opposed to 
studies that attempt to explain differences in performance of networks or actors.  
The last category assessing the literature on networks concerns the explanatory 
mechanism asking how the link between network and explanatory goal is modelled 
(Borgatti et al., 2003). While some studies focus on the content of ties and relations 
between network members (connectionists), others emphasis structural aspects such as 
brokerage positions, centrality, or embeddedness (structuralist).  
Categorizing methodological aspects 
The following five categories refer to methodological aspects. The findings in this 
regard were not so much used to classify the studies but rather to address preferences in 
the research on networks in China.  
The intentions of researchers can be followed in assessing first what they singled out 
as  unit of analysis. Network studies usually settle for one of the four following 
alternatives: individual actors, dyadic relations, networks, or multiple-networks. The 
difficulty in defining an appropriate unit of analysis lies in confusions regarding 
theoretical and methodological similarities between macro, meso, and micro levels in a 
business environment, in which clear authority relations cannot (yet) be identified. An 
organization can be considered a single actor in a network or can be regarded as a 
network itself (Borgatti et al., 2003). Multiple network analysis would argue, that an 
organization consists of a number of networks, such as an advice network, an information 
network, or a friendship network (Klein, Lim, Saltz, & Mayer, 2004) while concepts 
which focus on firms find it hard to delineate the boundaries of a firm (Holmström & 
Roberts, 1998; Krug, 2006).  
Another methodological category concerns the distinction between conceptual-
theoretical and empirical studies.  
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(category 8), either qualitative or quantitative, can be distinguished.  
Moreover, the findings of qualitative analysis, in particular interview techniques are 
taken seriously when it is argued that a number of scales require an adaptation to the 
specific cultural environment such as China. Because of variations in the perception of 
Lickert scales or the impact of social desirability biases for example, researchers not 
developing appropriate scales are in danger of using invalid measurements, besides 
spending time and resources on invaluable procedures (Abhik, Walters, & Luk, 2001). 
Farh et al. (2006) distinguish between an etic, i.e. universal, and an emic, i.e. specific (to 
cultural context), approach to scale development which should be made explicit in 
fieldwork (Farh, Cannella, Lee, & Lee, 2006; Farh, Tsui, Xin, & Cheng, 1998). 
Categorizing opinions expressed by authors 
The last five categories look at opinions expressed in the studies regarding the 
networks at stake. Studies might for example suggest certain origins of networks as 
already described above. The origins can be either of an intentional, generic, or cultural-
historical nature.  
How the type of governance mechanism of networks is evaluated forms another 
category. Studies distinguish between ‘self-enforcing’ governance mechanism prevalent 
in those cases where the social structure of the network itself serves to govern the 
behaviour of individual actors, and ‘trusted-third party’ mechanisms when referring to 
cases in which reputation mechanisms or referral to arbitration are focal governance 
mechanisms (Krug, 2003). While the cases above provide examples of private and market 
conforming forms of governance, other networks rely on legitimised ‘authority-driven’ 
mechanisms that are governed by fiat of a certain body, such as government agencies.  
Studies question the functional value of networks which can either be assumed to 
exist in a reduction of costs or risk, an improvement in coordination, or access to 
resources (Krug, 2007).  
Moreover, most studies offer an estimation about the future of networks under 
research. This question frequently occupies the academic community, which has not yet 
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strengthening significance of networks as claimed by authors.  
Finally studies can be distinguished according to their standpoint whether Western 
theories were applied to China as a case, or whether China is considered a research topic 
sui generis. Especially this last aspect indicates whether researchers believe China to 
offer unique insights into and the ability to challenge existing theories and concepts, or 
whether its growing significance merely follows existing patterns.  
In what follows, all aspects as seen in the different studies will be evaluated to show 
whether there is a trend in research and where the academic community is converging to 
one opinion. 
3. Findings  
The sample shows that four generic types of networks are at the centre of the analysis. 
They are first, networks of organizations in business when referring to qiye jituan, i.e. 
state-promoted business groups; second, networks of organizations in the civic society 
when discussing the role of Overseas Chinese Communities; third, networks of social 
relationships when referring to guanxi, and fourth, the notion of ‘network-’ or ‘clan-’ 
capitalism as an alternative economic model. 
This section is structured as follows. It starts with general information on the selected 
sample against which the more specific information on the four networks can be 
contrasted. The following subsections comprise specific information regarding the four 
identified generic networks. 
3.1.  Descriptive analysis of findings 
The academic controversy about the specificity of Chinese networks predominantly 
takes place in economic, sociological, and managerial journals. Most of the publications 
on networks in China are found in the area of ‘Social Capital’ (32%). Studies related to 
‘Networks of Organizations’ or ‘Organizational Networks’ and ‘Embeddedness’ account 
for another 20% each. About 59% discuss consequences of networks, applying a 
functional approach to explain an improvement in performance. As such, most of the 
literature explains the contribution of network to the overall socio-economic development 
predominantly in access to resources (48%) while some other focus on contagion, a more 
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or outputs (Borgatti et al., 2003). 
Methodologically most studies take the ‘network’ as their unit of analysis. Almost 
two third of the studies (58%) are empirical. There is a tendency towards qualitative 
methods of data collection (68%). Only in some cases, the scales used in the data 
collection were being specifically developed to fit the cultural context (38%). About half 
of the studies however analyse their data with quantitative methods in most cases simple 
descriptive statistics. More sophisticated statistical methods are only being used in a 
small number of studies such as micro-economic studies conducted for instance by the 
William Davidson Institute (Batjargal, 2005a, 2005b). Within the subset most 
publications put an explicit focus on China with the intention to test and develop existing 
Western theories.  
Most authors account the significance of networks in China’s economic development 
to cultural factors, predominantly Confucian philosophy (57%). Yet, they differ with 
respect to the inherent governance system within networks. While some assume the 
functioning of ‘self-enforcing’ governance mechanisms others argue for a form of private 
arbitration assisted by a ‘third-party’. Access to resources and superior forms of 
coordinating economic behaviour are the functional values of networks most often 
mentioned in these studies. More than 60% of authors believe that the impact of networks 
in the development of China’s economy will persists.  
3.2.  Network types specific to the Chinese context 
The four generic networks found in the set of literature on China will be presented in 
this section. First, a brief introduction into the subject of each type of network is given, 
followed by a presentation of the results. The findings are structured according to the 
classification scheme described in section 2.2. First, the respective body of literature will 
be classified into the context of network research. Next, the methodological aspects of the 
identified literature will be presented. Opinions expressed by the authors with respect to 
origin, predominant governance mechanisms, attributed functional value, and future of 
the discussed networks will be described before specific shortcomings of the research on 
the addressed network will be discussed.  
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Qiye jituans are networks of unrelated, diversified firms (still) under government 
control established by and around administrative bureaus during the 1980s (Keister, 
1998). With the gradual opening of China in 1978, China’s political authorities fostered 
connections between Chinese state-owned enterprises subsequently leading to the 
creation of these business groups. The motivation for promoting such a development was 
influenced by the success of the Japanese kereitsu or the Korean chabeol. After fiscal 
decentralisation transferred control rights and decision-making power to provincial 
authorities in 1987 they enjoyed considerable popularity when local government agencies 
considered business groups a promising mean to promote economic development.  
In 1995, the official numbers given was 20,000 business groups in the country (Ma & 
Lu, 2005) when it was also reported that they accounted for approximately one quarter of 
the total state-owned assets. Their number declined once privatisation policy during the 
1990s got off the ground (Keister, 2001). In 1997, the State Council selected 120 qiye 
jituans to strategically enhance international competitiveness of selected (mostly state-
owned) industries while incorporating small and underperforming state companies at the 
same time (Ma et al., 2005). Today, the share of state-ownership in business groups is 
estimated between 20% and 50%; some of them are large enough to be listed in the upper 
segments of the Fortunes’ Global 500 list such as Sinopec, State Grid, or China National 
Petroleum (Fortune Global 500, 2007).  
There are only few studies on qiye jituans before 1998 appearing predominantly in 
economic and sociological journals. Next to a number of publications on specific 
alliances within business groups, most studies are positioned in the research on 
‘Organizational Networks’ or ‘Networks of Organizations’. There is a clear emphasis on 
analysing the consequences of these networks mainly in terms of their economic 
performance. The focus on consequences instead of causes of these networks follows a 
known pattern of research in all relatively young fields. At an early stage, studies stress 
the significance of their research object (consequences), while once acknowledged 
research moves on to more fundamental questions (causes). In general, the type of 
research conducted in the field of business groups can best be described as an attempt to 
explain their functional value via an improved access to resources.  
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networks, most studies focus on the ‘network’ as unit of analysis. Probably because qiye 
jituans are assumed to be similar to the Japanese kereitsu or the Korean chabeol, most of 
them are testing existing Western economic theories. Subsequently, China is taken as a 
case while the findings are not fed back into the focus of this stream of research. The 
analysis is dominated by conceptual considerations using static models. There is no clear 
methodological approach in terms of data collection and analysis, let alone an attempt to 
adapt scales to the specific cultural context.  
Unsurprisingly, most authors agree on the question of the origin of qiye jituans. As 
constructs of political decision-making their governance is seen as ‘authority-driven’ 
despite the structural development towards privatization since their emergence in the 
1980s. Access to resources is considered their main functional value. Most studies predict 
that they will become more important in the future, both in safeguarding the privatization 
of SOE’s, and in creating national champions with the ability to compete internationally. 
This is reflected in the studies, which emphasize size, economic success, and strategic 
orientation of a number of these groups, some even going so far as to argue that the 
deliberate formation of business groups might be beneficial for economies in transition 
(Keister, 2001). 
To sum up, more empirical studies on Chinese business groups are needed. Neither 
structural approaches to the study of qiye jituans nor studies focusing on their 
coordinating values were found in the literature. Their contribution to the overall 
privatization process remains obscure so long as no dynamic models are developed to the 
effect that the significance of qiye jituans in China’s economic development remains 
unclear. Moreover, since both personal and inter-organizational relationships are 
recognized as crucial, business groups constitute an intriguing case for multi-level 
approaches. Finally, concentrating on one firm and examine its interaction with the 
network might lead to valuable insights; yet, most studies take the ‘network’ as the unit 
of analysis. By doing so, the question of network-costs which have to be borne by 
individual members are avoided and remain an unspecific factor (Nojonen, 2007).  
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Another distinct type of network within the China context is found in organized 
Chinese communities outside mainland China, so-called Overseas Chinese Communities. 
Their origin is well researched: In the geographic area of what is now considered China, 
migration has had a long history. Especially during the 19
th and the 20
th century many 
Chinese emigrated to South-East Asia and North America due to political unrest, wars 
and starvation where often enough they experienced severe discrimination and 
prosecution (Stuart-Fox, 2003). Nowadays, approximately 60 million Chinese live 
outside Mainland China, with the highest concentration in South-East Asia (Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) and North America. They form a social group with a 
strong ethnic identity. Assimilation to the new environment does to some extent take 
place; yet, tradition and language are maintained and cultivated. Overseas Chinese 
Communities identify themselves not so much by nationality but rather by shared 
backgrounds such as home village, last name, or clan membership (Jin, 1991). Family 
ties are valued much more than in other ethnic groups and are maintained both over 
generations and long distances (Hendrischke, 2007). Many Overseas Chinese 
Communities support relatives and home villages in China financially. After the opening 
of China’s economy and the acknowledgment of private enterprises, large amounts of 
foreign investments in China originated from wealthy Overseas Chinese Communities 
(Wei, Liu, Parker, & Vaidya, 1999). These are becoming increasingly organized in 
formal associations and clubs, hosting numerous official conferences and meetings. This 
process of formalization mainly took place during the last decade as these groups became 
increasingly exposed to a number of business and political initiatives originating from the 
People’s Republic of China (see for example Anonymous, 2005; Bank of Overseas 
Chinese, 2007; Overseas Chinese-American Entrepreneurs Association, 2007). Overseas 
Chinese Communities are not to be considered one unified network. They rather 
represent a network of separate, yet interrelated networks. Their interlinkages intensify 
with an increase in the degree of formalization. Simultaneously, their combined influence 
on the social and economic development in China is directed more strategically and the 
impact they exert becomes stronger.  
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Chinese Communities and their impact on China’s economic development. Most of them 
appeared in managerial and sociological journals.
2 Most of the literature on Overseas 
Chinese Communities positions itself in the area of ‘Organizational Networks’ or 
‘Networks of Organizations’. Studies focus the consequences such as trying o measure 
their performance or highlighting their impact on international trade or FDI (Gao, 2003; 
Rauch & Trindade, 2002).  
As has been the case with the studies on business groups, all studies use a 
connectionist approach to the research question by focusing on the relational 
embeddedness of actors. Interestingly enough, some studies mention structure as an 
important factor yet fail to include structure in their line of argumentation. The research 
reveals a tendency towards explaining contagion, i.e. processes of homogeneity fostering 
similar attitudes, shared beliefs, and practices (Borgatti et al., 2003).  
Methodological approaches too are similar to the studies on business groups. The 
‘network’ itself is the unit of analysis in all publications. Studies are exclusively 
empirical, in most cases employing quantitative approaches. Because information used is 
often derived from publicly available statistics on macro-economic indicators, none of the 
scales applied were adapted to the specific cultural context. This is neither surprising nor 
questionable since the explanatory power of the studies is restricted to providing a 
general picture of the influence of Overseas Chinese Communities. Whereas research on 
business groups, as noted above, is in many perspectives influenced by former research 
on their Japanese of Korean counterparts, the research on Overseas Chinese Communities 
mainly contributes to already existing theories. In contrast to Chinese business groups, 
Overseas Chinese communities can indeed be considered a uniquely Chinese 
phenomenon, offering attractive data for scrutinizing existing theories. Unsurprisingly, 
the studies unanimously agree that these networks emerged as historical and political 
incidents. ‘Self-enforcing’ governance mechanisms are argued to describe best the 
internal functioning whose dominant functional value is consequently ascribed to their 
coordinating advantage. The studies offer an ambiguous scenario for the future of 
Overseas Chinese Communities and their impact in China’s economic development. A 
                                                   
2 It can be assumed that a large body of literature exists in the area of Sinology and anthropology. 
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constant or even diminishing impact.  
Similar to the studies on business groups, the one on Overseas Chinese Communities 
remains under-researched. The review of the literature leaves the impression that the 
impact of for example Western direct investment is being overestimated, whereas direct 
investment from Overseas Chinese is regarded as marginal. Studies on Overseas Chinese 
communities do not use structural approaches. However, the ongoing formalization of 
these networks makes the use of such approaches an attractive research agenda. Finally, 
combining economic with sociological and anthropological studies on Overseas Chinese 
Communities might give insights into their functioning and better enable an assessment 
of their future role in China’s economy.  
Guanxi - Networks of social relations 
The third generic form of networks in China refers to the rather illusive concept of 
guanxi. Innumerable definitions on guanxi can be found in literature (e.g. Guthrie, 1998; 
Nee, 1992; Park & Luo, 2001; Tsang, 1998; Tsui & Farh, 1997; Yang, 2002). What the 
majority agrees on is the emphasis on informal social relationships between two or more 
individuals characterised by notions of trust, familiarity, reliance, and reciprocity (Faure, 
2000). Moreover, its strong embeddedness in Chinese culture, its central position in 
everyday business life, and its strategic importance in inter-organizational relationships 
are accepted undisputedly (Goodman, 2007). As such, the concept constitutes explicitly 
or implicitly an integral part of nearly all publications on networks in China. The fast 
economic development of China not easily explained by the usual macro-economic 
models has often tempted scholars to search for other explanations; in many cases guanxi 
seems to be the best alternative. While in the past, guanxi has been considered a major 
contributing fact for China’s economic growth, newer studies emphasise the costs in form 
of corruption and waste of resources (Nojonen, 2007). Literature on guanxi certainly 
comprises the earliest studies on networks conducted by Western social science, as 
already in the 16
th and 17
th century scholars have noticed the significance of personal 
relations in the Chinese culture (e.g. Leibniz, 1977). 
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area of management and sociology. However, as this field of research has a long history, 
many studies, especially older ones, can be found in history, philosophy, theology, 
Sinology, and anthropology. With over 55% of all publications included, guanxi clearly 
dominates research on networks in China. The focus still lies on explaining the causes of 
guanxi instead of emphasising its consequences. Only recently have publications 
emerged that look at both positive and negative aspects of guanxi or show the impact of 
guanxi in specific business situations, such as HRM practices, alliance formation, or 
supplier identification (Chen, Chen, & Xin, 2004; Millington, Eberhardt, & Wilkinson, 
2006). Most research takes place in the area of ‘Social Capital’, i.e. discussing the value 
of connections and assessing the impact of a person’s ego-network on aspects such as 
leadership, mobility, employment, or entrepreneurship (Batjargal & Liu, 2004; Bian, 
1997; Davies, Leung, Luk, & Yiu-Hing Wong, 1995; Li & Rozelle, 2003). The field is 
dominated by studies approaching guanxi networks from a connectionist approach, 
intending to explain deviations in performance where once more ‘access to resources’ is 
seen as the crucial advantage.  
Guanxi studies focus on individual actors and dyadic relations as unit of analysis. One 
negative side effect of this is that such a perspective possibly flattens the diverse nature 
of the impact of guanxi in daily life (Nojonen, 2007). Whereas research on its 
consequences can be explained by such a simple model, an analysis of its causes requires 
a more complex unit of analysis, such as interrelated or even multiple networks. In 
contrast to the studies on business groups and Overseas Chinese Communities, those on 
guanxi are dominated by qualitative methods, in which in-depth interviews play a central 
role. Therefore, more studies use scales that were developed for the specific research 
context. Data analysis is mixed insofar as both qualitative and quantitative methods are 
being applied. Guanxi studies often serve to develop existing theories. There is a clear 
tendency towards empirical studies employing static models for assessing the respective 
research question.  
As diverse as the literature on guanxi as diverse are opinions regarding its origin, 
governance mechanisms, functional value, and future significance. However, one has to 
be careful with collecting and assessing scholarly opinions on these matters. It is 
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without critically examining their justification. This might explain the persistence of the 
cultural essentialism in these studies which first articulated by Kahn (1979) explained 
China’s surprising economic development by its underlying values found in Confucian 
writings (Kahn, 1979). Recent publications try to put the record right by showing that 
significance of social relationships in China has been a side effect of the Cultural 
Revolution and was intensified by membership in political or military groups such as the 
People’s Liberation Army (Faure, 2000; Goodman, 2007). Others point out that the art of 
applying social relations or guanxi in daily business transaction has only emerged 
recently and has become increasingly difficult and complex since the opening of China’s 
economy (Nojonen, 2002; Wong, 1998). The governance mechanisms most frequently 
referred to are ‘reputation’ or ‘referral to third-party’. In some studies authors describe 
this as a self-enforcing mechanism, especially when guanxi  is considered rather a 
network itself instead of merely a dyadic social and informal relationship (Krug, 2006). 
The functional value of guanxi is mostly ascribed to an improved access to resources, 
which is in line with the classification of this stream of literature as research on social 
capital. Finally, the opinions regarding the future role and significance of guanxi are 
ambiguous. Whereas more than a third of all authors believe guanxi will prevail, only one 
study explicitly suggests a strengthening role in China’s social and business life. Recent 
studies (after 2000) which argue for a declining role of guanxi, account for approximately 
one fifth of the publications. 
In contrast to the two networks described above, guanxi is extensively being studied 
by researchers. In fact, it clearly dominates the body of literature on China-specific 
networks. There is a strong tendency towards explaining the beneficial factors of guanxi, 
while the ‘dark-side’ remains underrepresented. One major shortcoming of the literature 
is the unquestioned Chineseness of guanxi despite the fact that other societies show 
similar mechanisms and “… have developed similar practices to govern social interaction 
at some time or another… “ (Goodman, 2007: 176). Yet a debate is needed why and how 
social relationships seem to be more significant in China than in other business systems. 
Less quantity and more quality is strongly recommended in this field. Dynamic and 
longitudinal studies integrating the consequences of guanxi in more concrete and relevant 
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shift in terms from ‘Social Capital’ to ‘Embeddedness’ studies. A qualified assessment of 
the future role of guanxi in China for individuals and organizations should then become 
more plausible.  
Network Capitalism - Network as an alternative economic model 
The last identified area of research on generic Chinese networks is of a somewhat 
different character. The inclusion of this field is rather due to its distinctness in the 
respective literature than its relatedness to actual modern studies on networks in social 
science. It concerns an alternative economic model that has been introduced by the notion 
of network capitalism (Boisot & Child, 1996) or guanxi capitalism (Hamilton, 1996). 
What has been proposed is a specific variant of a capitalist system in which the major 
actor is a network itself. As such, this field of research possibly represents the most 
promising approach to understanding the significance of networks or social relationships 
as  guanxi in China’s socio-economic development. In 1992 already, Biggart and 
Hamilton have argued that neoclassical economics does poorly when it comes to 
explaining the process and success of some of Asia’s business systems (Biggart & 
Hamilton, 1992). Precisely this was the problem that led to a combination of Western 
economic theories with empirical findings based on other social science approaches as a 
new way for explaining China’s economic development. The focal objective relies on the 
consequences of a presumably network-driven environment in which not formalized 
ownership and property rights but relatively uncodified relationships derive legitimacy 
from social practices (Boisot et al., 1996). Because the research object in this field 
basically differs from the proceeding three, the initially developed classification scheme 
was only partially applicable to the selected publications. Moreover, only few articles on 
this context were found. Nevertheless, the attempt was made to approach this field of 
network research with a similar method.  
Most of the articles are published in economic journals. They mainly argue from a 
‘Social Capital’ perspective, focusing on the consequences of the deep embeddedness of 
networks. This is insofar not surprising as the topic, Network Capitalism, is based on the 
assumption of deeply embedded networks in China’s social and business environment. Its 
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refers to the importance of personal, informal relations and not to other possible networks 
such as business groups or Overseas Chinese Communities as described above. Also in 
line with the findings on social capital and guanxi networks is the explanatory 
mechanism applied. All publications use a connectionist perspective. They are 
predominantly conceptual using static models where China serves as a contributing case 
to (further) develop economic theory.  
The term Network Capitalism is found in all possible varieties in studies on networks 
in China, in many cases leading to conceptual confusions regarding the intentions of the 
authors. Often, it is merely applied as a buzz term to catch the attention of readers. The 
absence of a larger body of literature on Network Capitalism indicates both a lack of 
comparative studies and academic discussion on economic systems. Nevertheless, as 
argued above, the mere existence of this body of literature can be considered an indicator 
of the significance of networks in China’s and greater Asia’s economic development. 
Research on Network Capitalism seems to be the most promising field of the ones 
described for enhancing economic and sociological theories. Unfortunately, neither 
empirical studies nor theoretical contributions in academic journals indicate an existing 
interest in this field of network research. It is difficult to address possible directions for 
future research. The emphasis of connectionist approaches to the study of Network 
Capitalism seem more suitable than structuralist approaches since the value of 
relationships and not the structural characteristics of networks are to be emphasised. 
Nevertheless, recent economic and sociological findings on distinct networks in China – 
as the one described above – might yield to new approaches in the study of Network 
Capitalism. 
4. Conclusion  
4.1.  Summary of findings 
As this overview shows, research on networks in China is diverse in its description 
and analysis. By systematically analysing the literature on networks in China, four 
networks have been identified within this field, all of which can be considered generic to 
the Chinese business environment. While networks in business (qiye jituans), networks in 
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alternative economic model), have received limited attention, only guanxi (the network of 
social relationships) clearly dominates the field. The research on networks in China 
emphasises access to resource as their dominant functional value, while reduction of 
transaction costs and risks are less a topic. A comparison with the catalogue of criteria 
used in the general research on networks shows that the analysis of Chinese networks still 
lags behind the generally accepted analytical social science frame. Most studies use a 
connectionist explanatory mechanism and static models to derive arguments and 
construct models. The emphasis on the consequences of networks might be the reason 
why a cultural, only limitedly substantiated explanation for the relative significance of 
networks in China still prevails in the academic discussion. Only recently have 
researchers begun to move away from this cultural essentialism towards more 
substantiated explanations (Hendrischke, 2007; Wank, 1996). A significant number of 
studies insists on China being a research topic sui generis, following the callings of a 
number of scholars to discard existing (neoclassical) economic theories because of their 
limited ability to explain processes taking place in a number of (especially Asian 
transitory) economies. 
4.2.  Implications for future research 
Despite the large variety of research on networks in China, the results of this study 
suggest some future directions for the field. More research on business groups, Overseas 
Chinese Communities, and Network Capitalism is needed while the field could most 
likely spare more studies on guanxi.  
The subject of business groups might benefit from more empirical studies using a 
structuralist approach. On the one hand, they seem suitable for multiple-network analysis 
since both personal and professional ties between group members are assumed to be 
significant. On the other hand, case studies on individual organizations within business 
groups might yield insights into the positive and negative implications of membership. 
Similar to business groups, research on Overseas Chinese Communities will benefit from 
structuralist approaches which should be easier to conduct in the future due to the process 
of formalization taking place within and between these communities. The stream of 
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on the implications of embedded informal, personal relationships. One of the major 
fallacies in this field is the large number of studies doing not much more than 
emphasising the presence of networks and social relations in China. However, as Boisot 
and Child (1996) phrased it, “… it is not the presence of networking that is distinctive 
about China’s emerging economic order but, rather, the depth and nature of its social 
embeddedness.” (Boisot et al., 1996: 623). Many studies on guanxi continue to explain 
functioning and consequences, while failing to carve out the distinctiveness, i.e. the 
relative significance, of personal and informal relationships in China compared to other 
economic environments. Much needed research on the costs of guanxi is also still largely 
missing (exception Nojonen, 2007). Lastly, the field of Network Capitalism will benefit 
both from better endogenizing the three types of networks and from an intensified 
discussion on comparative business systems.  
One type of research on networks, despite its promising contributions, has been 
entirely disregarded by studies on networks in China. Studies on Convergence focus on 
processes of social and environmental shaping (Borgatti et al., 2003). The basic concept 
underlying this field is structural equivalence proposing actors in an environment to be 
structurally similar in being linked to the same partners. Taking an attributal perspective 
these studies intend to explain homogeneity between actors. Both structural and relational 
elements are being combined. If networks indeed significantly characterise and affect the 
Chinese economic development, then the effects of structural equivalency should be well 
observable in this environment. Borgatti et al. suggest that especially institutional 
theories fit in this area (Borgatti et al., 2003). Dynamic models will lead to deeper 
insights into the actual functioning and relative significance of networks. These 
approaches should moreover yield to further understanding the relation between formal 
and informal institutions in China’s socio-economic development. 
5. Discussion 
Networks are neither linked to a specific culture nor, as economic historians have 
shown, to a specific period of time (Faure, 2000; Greif, 2006; Tilly, 1987). The fact that 
networks seem to be everywhere and nowhere is the outcome of how economic and 
social collective action is perceived in social sciences. While anthropology and parts of 
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on shared values, or family relations which defy further analysis, the problem within 
economics is that networks were originally situated between markets and hierarchies. 
Yet, the case of China gives further evidence to the claim that networks are not a distinct 
coordination mechanism that can simply be added to other forms of coordination, let 
alone economic regimes. Instead, networks can be combined with all other coordinating 
forms and cultures. They might differ in origin, purpose, professionalism, and 
embeddedness. Despite this, what they have in common is the use of social relations as a 
base for pursuing socio-economic goals by collective action.  
China in this respect offers a unique environment for the study of networks. Their 
relative significance in the country’s economy long has been emphasised. The absence of 
rigid institutional arrangements as known in the West moreover seemingly speeds up the 
process of change in China resulting in dynamics facilitating the study of networks. 
However, the conduction of research in China implies a number of difficulties 
challenging researchers’ possibilities in designing social studies as transparently as in 
other economies. While evaluating findings of this study as well as results of future 
research these challenges have to be kept in mind. Despite these specific characteristics, 
China and its economic development offer chances to substantially enhance existing 
theories in modern Western social sciences.  
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Abstract. Governments around the world are faced with the 
challenge of an increasing sophistication of the technological base at 
home and abroad. How they cope with it is reflected in institutional 
change. Highlighting Korea’s stunning growth in financial inputs to 
its innovation system since the early 1980s, this paper provides an in-
depth and first-hand account of the ongoing changes to South 
Korea’s national innovation system. Emphasis is given to the most 
recent reform enacted in 2004. It is concluded that Korea’s NIS is an 





The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has witnessed a phenomenal pace of 
growth since the 1970s, with per capita incomes in real US dollar terms rising seven 
fold over the past 30 years. Reaching the level of 20,000 USD in per capita GDP is a 
declared government objective that will probably be met in 2008. From a nation 
shattered by the upheavals of the Korean War (1950-1953) it has been transformed to 
the world’s tenth largest economy and the third largest in Asia. It is important to note 
this has been achieved with a minimum of foreign assistance. Commonly touted as 
one of East Asia’s four dragons (alongside Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore) Korea 
today can clearly be counted among the advanced industrialized nations. Though the 
exact causes and mechanisms of this startling advance are subject to an ongoing 
academic debate, dwelling in particular on the role of the state in this context 
(Amsden 1989, Krugman 1994), most scholars would subscribe to the notion that a 
set of well-defined science, technology and innovation (STI) policies – suited to the 
specific needs of a late industrializing country - have underpinned that growth in a 
very significant fashion.
2  
                                                
1 This paper was presented at the workshop “Institutional underpinnings of economic competitiveness 
in East Asia”, held on 5 March 2007 in Tutzing. The author would like to thank the session chair and 
all participants for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial assistance by Friedrich-Naumann-
Foundation and Ministry of Education, Republic of Korea is acknowledged. 
2 This interpretation is supported by recent World Bank research which noted Korea’s successes in total 
factor productivity (TFP) in comparison to Mexico. TFP essentially is about the development and 
successful exploitation of knowledge and innovation.  
Driven by external (the rise of China) and internal (ageing population) factors, 
Korea has embarked on becoming a knowledge society in which traditional factors of 
production such as capital and labor are progressively superseded by new dimensions 
such as patents, research and development (R&D) and availability of knowledge 
workers. A knowledge society is one that “creates, shares and uses knowledge for the 
prosperity and well-being of its people” (http://www.med.govt.nz/pbt/infotech/digital-
strategy/draft/draft-11.html). It was estimated by the OECD that over 50 percent of 
GDP in the major OECD economies has become knowledge-based. And as much as 
70 to 80 percent of economic growth is now said to be due to new and better 
knowledge (OECD 1996). These insights frame the current debate within Korea about 
the impending innovation challenge and the proper strategies required to carve out a 
profitable niche in the sandwich position between high-tech Japan and low-tech China.  
These insights immediately invite the question of how the institutional 
underpinnings of Korea’s national innovation system (NIS) look like today, how they 
evolved over time and to what extent, if any, they could be replicated in other 
countries. The paper will investigate the hypothesis, that Korea’s relative success in 
S&T owes much to the distinct patterns of up-stream governance of its NIS. In so 
doing, we will first introduce the theory of national innovation system as it has been 
developed mainly by Scandinavian scholars from the late 1980s. The following part 
will entail a summary of Korea’s experiences with S&T and dwell on how its NIS has 
developed over the past fourty years. Next we will shed light on the most recent 
changes to Korea’s upstream innovation governance. The article concludes by a 
summary of strengths and weaknesses of Korea’s NIS. 
 
General picture of S&T in Korea 
Under the leadership of President Roh Moo-hyun, elected to office in 2002, 
the Korean government has made big strides in attempting to foster R&D across the 
board, both within public research institutes and the private sector which finances 
75% of R&D in Korea. This resolve is mirrored in comparative S&T statistics usually 
placing Korea on par with the advanced countries of North America and Europe, at 
least as far as financial inputs to R&D are concerned. General expenditure on R&D 
(GERD), the broadest measure of money flowing to science and research in an 
economy, peaked at 25 billion US dollars in 2005, the highest figure the country has 
seen since statistics were first compiled in the early 1960s (Figure 1). Since 1970 
GERD has expanded by a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 26.1%. 
Considering the relative share of GERD in relation to GDP, Korea also compares very 
favorably with other countries: the ratio of GERD over GDP is at 2.99% (2005), a 
very healthy figure against Japan’s 3.15% (2003), Sweden’s 3.98%, Germany’s 
2.52% and the United States’ 2.68% (OECD 2005).
3 This coincided with a 
considerable improvement in the annual rankings of the World Competitiveness 
Yearbook by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD). In the 
field of science competitiveness Korea advanced from 28th (1998) to 12th (2006) 
position, and from 27th (2003) to 6th (2006) place in technology competitiveness 
(IMD 2006). These figures are particularly noteworthy as the country’s overall 
ranking has slightly slipped to 38th over the past eight years. So clearly there is a 
positive momentum in the field of science and technology which is further supported 
by a host of indicators beyond the IMD league tables such as R&D intensity (R&D as 
                                                                                                                                       
(http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/235384/KoreaKE-Overview.pdf). For an overview of 
STI policies Teubal (1997). 
3 Government projections in Korea foresee a rise of GERD/ GDP to 5.2% by 2030.  
a percentage of GDP), the government R&D budget,
4 the number of researchers and 
science personnel and the number of publications measured by the Science Citation 
Index (SCI). All of these show very healthy upward trends. All together Korea has 
shown a propensity to constant fine-tuning of its innovation governance in synch with 
a changing technological, social, economic and political environment. 
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Figure 1: GERD (right scale) and GERD as a percentage of GDP (left scale) in Korea, 1970 to 2005. 
Source: MOST S&T database. 
 
National innovation systems 
Innovations are the lifeblood of any modern economy, as they propel 
economic growth by means of technical change (OECD 1992). Yet despite their 
significance the economic and other sciences are only edging marginally closer to a 
comprehensive understanding applicable across time and space of how, why and 
when innovations emerge or not. Innovation is a ubiquitous phenomenon in any 
modern economy and has, therefore, been studied in a variety of contexts, including in 
relation to technology, commerce, social systems, economic development, and policy 
construction. Lundvall who stressed the importance of learning and user-producer 
interaction in his groundbreaking book on the subject wrote: “In practically all parts 
of the economy, and at all times, we expect to find ongoing processes of learning, 
searching and exploring, which result in new products, new techniques, new forms of 
organization and new markets.” (Lundvall 1992: 8). In the course of this ambitious 
strand of research that gained substantial pace from the mid 1980s, a near consensus 
has emerged that “government matters” in fostering innovative processes. As Ahrens 
(Ahrens 2002 : 10) puts it: “This new line of thinking seeks to bring politics back in 
and to overcome the apparent dichotomy between the market and the state as two 
mutually exclusive mechanisms of resource allocation. (…) Thus the pendulum has 
actually begun to swing back toward redefining the role of the state in economic 
                                                
4 The 2007 government R&D budget amounts to 10 billion USD. Until 2010 the R&D budget will 
grow by 10% annually. This is about one half of Germany’s public R&D budget, and 1/15 of the US.  
development.” This forceful logic is equally true for the role of government in the 
innovation game, where it is now considered a very important player, sitting either at 
the supplying end (e.g. through providing funding for scientists) or at the receiving 
end (e.g. through innovation-enhancing public procurement). 
  This raises two pertinent questions: first about the shape of a limited, but 
effective government (World Bank 1993: 84) and second about how to best design the 
innovation governance matrix that procures policy advice and frames interventions, 
particularly so in rapidly developing countries such as South Korea that have had little 
time in making the paradigmatic shift in their national innovation systems from 
imitation to innovation. Adopting third generation innovation policies that anchor 
science and innovation at the very heart of government action across multiple policy 
domains remains a prime challenge (OECD 2006). And so does the crafting of proper 
innovation governance, i.e. the institutional matrix through which policies are 
fashioned, prioritized and delivered. 
Early explanations of innovative activity focused exclusively on inputs 
(financial and human resources) being utilized in a linear model of innovation 
stretching seamlessly from basic research to commercialization. New technology was 
assumed to start with basic research and move through applied research, invention, 
commercial market testing, and ultimately to diffusion. Innovations were considered 
the result of a linear process made up of different stages that take place in a sequential, 
hierarchical and one-way order. The adoption of this linear concept of innovation 
could lead to the conclusion that high investments in R&D would have positive 
consequences on productivity and growth. However, during the 1970s and 1980s the 
emergence of new and important technologies was followed by a reduction of 
productivity in the majority of the OECD countries (OECD 1991). The apparent 
contradiction between these facts was known as the productivity paradox. The Green 
Book on Innovation (European Commission 1995) also highlighted this paradox in 
relation to European countries. The pitfalls of the linear model of innovation became 
increasingly evident, in that it ignores the importance and influence of institutions 
(North 1990) and other market and non-market factors which in various and complex 
ways impinge upon the emergence of new products and services (OECD 1992). In the 
light of these new findings, the basic assumptions behind the linear model lost much 
of their explanatory power and appeal to policy makers. The new focus on the 
economic importance of knowledge and its properties helped a radically different 
perspective on innovative activity to thrive: national innovations systems.  
The theory of national innovation systems was first conceived in the second 
half of the 1980s to provide a broad-based account and add analytical rigor to the 
understanding of innovative activity in a given economy (Lundvall 1985), (Freeman 
1987), (Lundvall 1988), (Nelson 1993), (Lundvall 1992), (Edquist 1997), (Edquist 
2001), (Chaminade and Edquist 2006). NIS theory frames innovation not as a linear 
process, but as a complex interaction between various institutions, in particular 
governments, universities, private and public research institutes and private firms. The 
point of departure is the existence and reproduction of entities in biology or, if 
translated to the economic world, a certain configuration of technologies and 
organizational forms. There are mechanisms that create diversity (i.e. innovations) in 
the system and there are selection mechanisms (i.e. nature or the market) that reduce 
diversity by increasing or decreasing the relative importance of elements through a 
“filtering system” (Edquist 1997: 6). This filter ensures that only entities survive that 
adapt with a tolerable fit (Hodgson 1993). Through that lens technological change is a 
path-dependent and open-ended process where a system never reaches an equilibrium  
state because technologies are only superior in a relative, not an absolute sense. 
National innovation systems are open systems (as opposed to closed systems) with an 
often discontinuous transition to states characterized by greater complexity, path-
dependency, multi-stability and heterogeneity of agents. Their openness implies a 
limited degree of determinism making it hard to foresee or predict outcomes (Nicolis 
and Prigogine 1989, Saviotti 1997: 182). NIS are highly knowledge intensive which is 
generated through search activities in individual and collective learning processes.  
Evolutionary theories as the basis of national innovation systems theory share 
three characteristics, hailing from biological evolution but adapted to socio-economic 
evolution (Nelson and Winter 1982). 1) retention and transmission of knowledge; 2) 
generation and novelty leading to diversity; 3) selection among alternatives. These 
three principles are underpinned by the assumption that explanations of why an 
evolutionary pattern of change occurred must be identified in the decisions and 
actions of various economic agents, implying that the evolutionary logic can be 
leveled to describe innovation systems at different levels, such as national, regional or 
sectoral (McKelvey 1997:202). Rather than focusing on the individual and isolated 
units within the economy (firms, consumers) NIS flag the collective underpinnings of 
innovation and address the overall system that creates and distributes knowledge. In 
doing so innovation is construed as an outcome of evolutionary processes within these 
systems, and unlike in neoclassic theory information asymmetries are not considered a 
market failure but essential stepping stones of variety and novelty. 
How players in the NIS interact and share knowledge in a productive way has 
captured the attention of policy makers and academics for the past decade and 
continues to pose a considerable research challenge. What has emerged thus far is a 
prevailing consensus that a systems approach to understand the dynamics of 
innovation is more realistic and provides a more useful yardstick to policy making 
than does the linear model of innovation. Edquist (Edquist 1997: 14) defines 
innovation systems as “all important economic, social, political, organizational, 
institutional, and other factors that influence the development, diffusion, and use of 
innovations”. Nelson (1993) expresses similar views in defining NIS as “the elements 
and relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and 
economically useful, knowledge…and are either located within or rooted inside the 
borders of a nation state”. Depending on the objective and the level of analysis, 
innovation systems can be supranational, national, regional or sectoral. The NIS 
approach reckons that successful innovations depend on long-term relationships and 
close interaction between the innovative organisation and external organisations and 
institutions. Moreover, this systemic approach to innovation considers that innovative 
activity and interactions between innovative agents are strongly influenced by the 
institutional environment. Institutions can be described as “sets of common habits, 
routines, established practices, rules, or laws that regulate the relations and 
interactions between individuals, groups and organizations” (Edquist and Johnson 
1997). “Institutions are the rules of the game”, according to North (North 1990: 3), 
and their main function is to “reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not 
necessary efficient) structure to human interaction” (Ibidem: 6). Because institutions 
influence the way individuals, firms and organisations behave, relate to each other, 
learn and use their knowledge, they affect the emergence of innovations. Institutions 
have been rightly termed the “missing link” in the study of economic, political and 
social systems. The NIS approach thus highlights that actors do not innovate in 
isolation but within continuous interactions with other organizations in the system (at 
regional, national and supranational level). Their coordination of innovative activities  
involves two dual and concomitant processes, i.e. flows of economic resources in 
transaction and production processes as well as transformation and transmittal of 
information that shape coordination and behaviour (Norgren and Hauknes 2000: 6). 
Though a more nuanced understanding of these flows has emerged over the last ten 
years, their detailed understanding still poses considerable challenges to researchers 
and policy-makers. What appears certain however is that in evolutionary economic 
perspective on qualitative technological change and innovation is regarded the most 
important driver of economic growth. 
One of the earliest explicit contributions to NIS theory can be found in 
Freeman (Freeman 1987) who studied major elements of the Japanese system and 
thus became the first to use the term ‘national innovation system’ in published form. 
In his words a national innovation system is “the network of institutions in the public 
and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and 
diffuse new technologies” (Freeman 1987: 1). In the second groundbreaking book on 
the subject, Lundvall (Lundvall 1992) explained his radical departure from 
neoclassical economics and the resulting motivation by way of two assumptions: 
“First, it is assumed that the most fundamental resource in the modern economy is 
knowledge and, accordingly, that the most important process is learning. (…) Second, 
it is assumed that learning is predominantly an interactive and, therefore, a socially 
embedded process which cannot be understood without taking into consideration its 
institutional and cultural context.” (Lundvall 1992: 1). Lundvall identifies NIS as 
complex, dynamic and social systems “constituted by elements and relationships 
which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and economically useful, 
knowledge (…) either located within or rooted inside the borders of a nation state.” 
(Lundvall 1992: 2). This suggests that innovation is no longer an extraordinary event 
entering from outside and temporarily disturbing the general equilibrium but rather a 
pervasive, all-around phenomenon of modern capitalism. In all visible essentials, 
innovation now appears to be a process of interactive learning, not a single discreet 
event (Lundvall 1992: 8-9). It follows from what has been said that a useful 
distinction between national innovation systems in a broad sense (encompassing all 
parts and aspects of the economic structure and the institutional set-up) and a narrow 
sense (entailing only organizations and institutions involved in searching and 
exploring, i.e. firm R&D departments, universities) can be made (Lundvall 1992: 12). 
Lundvall himself suggests that the boundaries of a national innovation system cannot 
be sharply determined, but seems to prefer the delimiter of national boundaries in 
contrast to global, regional or sectoral innovation systems.  
The next prominent scholar on NIS theory is Nelson (Nelson 1993) who 
introduces no explicit definition of an innovation system but, unlike Lundvall whose 
analysis was mainly theoretically informed, Nelson provides 15 case studies from a 
variety of countries, sandwiched in between a general opening and closing chapter. 
While venturing discontent with the somewhat abstract and broad concept of national 
innovation systems, Nelson and Rosenberg sum up their research approach as follows: 
“the orientation of this project has been to carefully describe and compare, and try to 
understand, rather than theorize first and then attempt to prove or calibrate the theory” 
(Nelson and Rosenberg 1993: 4). These three books together are considered the 
classic foundation of NIS theory, where a lot of the later works are built on.  
Other major publications concerned about national innovation systems are 
summarized in the following portion. Patel and Pavitt (Patel and Pavitt 1994) in an 
overview article welcome NIS as a serious attempt to define and describe the metrics 
of intangible investments made by countries and companies and to account for the  
important differences between countries in the levels of these investments. National 
innovation systems are defined as “the national institutions, their incentive structures 
and their competencies, that determine the rate and direction of technological learning 
(or the volume and composition of change-generating activities in a country.” (Patel 
and Pavitt 1994: 12). Within this approach, and in line with earlier work, the public 
sector is identified as an important player in systems research about innovative 
activity. The article concludes with a call for more and better data related to 
innovation and for more in-depth scholarship on the differing institutional 
competencies across countries that underpin the economic benefits of learning 
activities (Patel and Pavitt 1994: 27).   
In another seminal contribution to NIS theory, Edquist (Edquist 1997) sums up 
the basic ingredients of national innovation systems: “Innovation processes are 
influenced by many factors; they occur in interaction between institutional and 
organizational elements which together may be called ‘systems of innovation’.” 
(Edquist 1997: preface). He also reported that the theoretical foundation of innovation 
systems research is rather patchy. Conceding that NIS is highly relevant from a 
policy-making point of view, Edquist points out the lack of conceptual rigour inherent 
to any new theory such as a systems theory of national innovation systems. In this 
environment innovation processes occur over time and are characterized by feedback 
loops, frequent inter- and intra organizational interaction and shaped by institutions. 
Edquist (Edquist 1997: 14) defines innovation system as “all important economic, 
social, political, organizational, institutional, and other factors that influence the 
development, diffusion, and use of innovations”. Thus he cautions against an ex-ante 
inclusion of certain elements of a system. Edquist’s work is important in that it 
complements nicely earlier writings by Freeman, Lundvall and Nelson.  
More recent work of Niosi defined NIS as “the system of interacting private 
and public firms (either large or small), universities, and government agencies aiming 
at the production of science and technology within national borders. Interactions 
among these units may be technical, commercial, legal social, and financial, in as 
much as the goal of the interaction is the development, protection, financing or 
regulation of new science and technology” (Niosi et al. 1993: 212). Niosi borrowed 
the terminology of “x-efficiency” (Leibenstein 1976) and concluded in an analogy to 
firms that national innovation systems are not operating optimally but exhibit a 
variable level of efficiency, depending on their internal organization and accumulated 
knowledge.  
For the purpose of this study the definition of Metcalfe (Metcalfe 1995) is 
particularly insightful because he expressively re-affirms government’s position at the 
nexus of policy development and implementation. For him a “system of innovation is 
that set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually contributes to the 
development and diffusion of new technologies and which provides the framework 
within which governments form and implement policies to influence the innovation 
process. As such it is a system of interconnected institutions to create, store and 
transfer the knowledge, skills and artefacts which define new technologies.” (Metcalfe 
1995: 462-463). Taken together these definitions vary in detail but are broadly 
informed by three principles. 1) Organizations do not innovate in isolation but in close 
collaboration with various subsystems the quality and efficacy of which define the 
overall outcomes of the innovation system (Freeman 1987, Smits 2002). 2). More and 
very heterogeneous actors are involved in the management of innovation processes 
(Grimmer et al. 1999). 3) National innovation systems are path-dependent. This 
“memory” should be taken into account in the course of any analysis (Rosenberg  
1976, Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997). And these trends collectively urge government 
to take the leading role as innovation system builder and facilitator (Smits and 
Kuhlmann 2002: 12). As such the NIS approach has a systemic perspective on 
innovation which is mainly the result of various agents’ actions and mutual relations/ 
interactions. This approach reckons that successful innovations depend on long-term 
relationships and close interaction between the innovative organisation and external 
organisations and institutions. Moreover, this systemic approach to innovation 
considers that innovative activities and interactions between innovative agents are 
strongly influenced by the institutional environment. 
Ultimately, governments around the world are faced with the challenge of an 
increasing sophistication of the technological base at home and abroad. Science is 
infinitely a more complex thing than policy makers would generally admit. This 
transformation has led to an upgrading of the means and instruments of S&T policy 
making itself, and a detailed study covering the governance of the upstream S&T 
system in Korea will therefore be meaningful to reveal sources of economic 
competitiveness.  
 
Korea’s innovation governance past and present 
Economics borrowed the term “governance” from political science, where it used to 
connote “structures and practices of coordination and control without a sovereign 
power” (Benz 2007: 1). Governance structures underlying the process of 
policymaking craft institutions which provide individuals with specific (dis)incentives 
for their action and thus affect political and economic outcomes (North 1990). Hence, 
governance is not a synonym for government; the former rather highlights the 
importance of state capacity and institutional variety (Ebner 2005). More recently, 
governance was defined as “the capacity of the institutional matrix (in which 
individual actors, organizations and policymakers interact) to implement public 
policies, enforce rules and regulations, and to improve private sector coordination” 
(Ahrens 2002). And de la Mothe aptly characterized governance as “the handling of 
complexity and the management of dynamic flows. It is fundamentally about 
interdependence, linkages, networks, partnerships, co-evolution and mutual 
adjustment” (de la Mothe 2001). 
  This paper is chiefly concerned about the emerging reference frame of 
upstream innovation governance. It is argued that there is a) a need for distinguishing 
different levels of governance (in addition to the classical separation in public and 
private) and b) a growing academic interest to characterize how STI policies are 
framed and implemented within countries and regions. Therefore, upstream 
innovation governance refers to the formal and informal rules, incentives and 
constraints which shape the interaction of high-level state actors in national systems 
of innovation. In that it specifically addresses the instruments and mechanisms of 
priority-setting
5, policy coherence
6 and institutional learning. This is applied to the 
case of Korea, a country that over the past four decades has experienced distinctive 
phases in its upstream innovation governance. Throughout the various stages of 
development, Korea’s innovation governance has evolved and improved in lockstep 
with changes in the external environment and internal needs (Figure 2) 
  
                                                
5 Schlossstein (2007b), Schlossstein and Park (2006) 





























Figure 2: Adaptive evolution of Korea’s innovation governance. 
 
At the very beginning, the “Division of Technology Management” in the 
Economics Planning Board (EPB) was charged with S&T policy making.
7 Under the 
heavy-handed leadership of President Park Chung-hee the country switched to an 
export promotion strategy in 1964, after US support was withdrawn, affording Korean 
companies a chance to upgrade their technological capabilities via exposure to foreign 
markets and better capitalize on imports that included technology in some form. The 
choice of appropriate technology and its adaptation required a minimum of 
indigenous R&D capability. Coinciding with the first five year economic 
development plan, a full Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and the 
Science and Technology Promotion Law were established, both in 1967. This earned 
Korea a reputation for being the first developing country with a ministry-level 
organization for S&T. In addition to trade, science education in secondary schools and 
universities was initiated. With the basic infrastructure in place, the 1970s can be 
construed as the growth stage of Korean S&T with the focus shifting to capital and 
technology intensive industries, heavy and chemical industries, and emphasis on the 
education of qualified scientists and engineers. In 1973 a Council for Science and 
Technology (CST), chaired by the Prime Minister, was established and tasked with 
overall planning of the science system. However, this group was largely ineffective as 
it met only four times in a decade (Lim 2000).
8 In the second half of the 1970s a 
number of government-supported research institutes (GRI) were created which for 
many years formed the backbone of scientific research in Korea.
9  
The development of technological capabilities in the private sector was the 
policy thrust of the 1980s. A rapid increase in real wages and labor disputes forced 
firms to firmly embrace technological development. Led by the government, this was 
achieved in two ways. First, through a reform of tax incentives for private sector R&D, 
                                                
7 EPB is a government body credited with engineering Korea’s economic growth from the 1960s to the 
1980s. It was merged with the Ministry of Finance in 1995.  
8 Later attempts, such as the PCPST, were similarly ineffective. This situation was only remedied with 
the establishment of the National Science and Technology Council in 1999, under the direction of the 
president (and no longer the prime minister). 
9 In the early days, GRI employees had the status of civil servants. After 1982, when MOST took 
control of GRIs, the employees’ status changed to researchers.   
and second through a national R&D program by MOST in 1982 and by the Ministry 
of Commerce, Industry and Energy in 1987 which both aimed at the deployment of 
indigenous R&D capabilities. These new government programs came at a time when 
the private sector already spent as much on R&D as government and heralded the 
advent of the “select and concentrate” principle which basically stipulates that 
government should only act as catalyst for private investment, and not as its 
replacement (“crowding out”). Major industries of the 1980s included semiconductors, 
steel, automobiles and shipbuilding which continue to account for much of Korea’s 
competitiveness in the global marketplace.  
By the 1990s S&T activity on the government and private levels were greatly 
expanded as evidenced by the fact that 75% of Korea’s cumulative R&D investment 
was allocated past 1990. Starting with the Highly Advanced National (HAN) Projects 
in 1992, the first government R&D program in Korean history to be crafted through 
inter-ministerial consensus-building, the decade saw a three-fold rise in GERD and 
the emergence of an institutional framework needed to steer the proliferation of 
science and technology across the board. The focus was firmly on reinforcing high-
tech industries, in particular information technologies and semiconductors (Figure 3).  
Along with a proliferation of stakeholders, in particular ministries, the 
“coordinating function” became seemingly weak and ministries continued to push 
their own vested projects. The Prime Minister, entrusted with overall R&D 
management, could not effectively remedy this trend, since most of the decision 
power is in the hands of the president of Korea; S&T statistics and indicators were 
underdeveloped and government officials lacked crucial knowledge about S&T 
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Figure 3: Major development stages of S&T in Korea since the 1960s. 
Source: Author. 
Although being regarded as a successful model of technological catch-up, 
Korea is presented with the challenge of transitioning from a catch-up innovation 
system to a system that truly supports the build-up of an indigenous knowledge base. 
This can only be achieved through deep institutional reforms that go much beyond 
funding considerations and ultimately cure the shortcomings of the Korean NIS, i.e. a 
lack of comprehensive coordination, weak linkages between S&T policies and 
government budget, excessive competition among ministries, weak evaluation and 
some overlaps in the missions of the GRIs (Hong 2005). To counter these perceived 
problems, the Korean government since 1999 has enacted a series of cross-cutting 
organizational reforms aimed at strengthening coordination among ministries and 
R&D agencies as well as improving harmony among different policy measures. With 
the need for horizontal STI policies becoming more obvious, the government in 2004 
created a new governance structure build around the hallmarks of integration and  
coherence (Figure 4). As it entails some elements that have drawn international 
attention, this new governance structure deserves closer attention. 
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Figure 4: Korea’s national innovation system after the 2004 reform (MOST – Ministry of Science and Technology, MOCIE – 
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, MIC – Ministry of Communication, MOE – Ministry of Education, MOD – 
Ministry of Defence).  
Source: Author. 
The revised five year (2003-2007) S&T basic plan, which was re-edited after 
the inauguration of the new government in February 2003, proposed the reinstatement 
of Korea as an S&T nation and it was declared as a major policy goal that Korea’s 
global competitiveness in S&T would reach the 8
th place in the world by 2007. 
Ranked no 6 in technological infrastructure and no 12 in scientific infrastructure by 
the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2006, Korea is en route to achieving the 
stated objectives. The basic policy directions of the revised S&T basic plan are 
advancing the national S&T governance system, select and focus on strategic future 
S&T areas, strengthen future growth engines (a new government R&D program), 
strengthen regional innovation systems, create new jobs matching the demands of a 
knowledge-based society and expand people’s participation and spread a general S&T 
culture. What is new about the revised basic plan is that it defined S&T as being the 
foundation of society, economy and culture and that it derived concrete policy 
measures from this point of departure.  
Korea’s S&T governance is now led by the President who is head of the 
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) which was created in 1999 and 
acts as the highest decision-making body for S&T in Korea. NSTC is tasked with the 
following mission: 
  Formulation and co-ordination of major policy and planning for S&T. 
  Allocation and co-ordination of the national R&D budget reflecting the 
result of the NSTC’s review. 
  Planning of the mid- and long-range national R&D program, including 
the New Growth Engines.  
  Measures for developing GRIs 
While having no standing staff, it is composed of three subcommittees, the 
Steering Committee, the Special Committee on National Technology Innovation and 
the Special Committee on Next Generation Growth Engines. Regular meetings are 
held three times a year and prepared by the Office of Science and Technology 
Innovation (OSTI), a unit within with MOST serving as a secretariat to the NSTC. 
Headed by a Vice Minister, OSTI employs 100 staff members drawn from MOST  
(50%), from other government ministries (25%) and from the private sector (25%). It 
is hoped that this unique combination of skills will provide rich perspectives on the 
future development of STI policies in Korea, but some early pitfalls came to light as 
some junior officials lacked a proper understanding of the nature of the innovation 
process (from discussions with MOST staff). OSTI was created on 25 October 2004. 
OSTI’s policy intelligence mainly flows from KISTEP, a government research 
institute which works almost exclusively for OSTI. Individuals in the two 
organizations have day-to-day interaction, and KISTEP is regarded as an important 
repository of knowledge, in particular as regards statistics, for the government. Under 
OSTI, there are also three research councils for basic, industrial and public S&T 
which group around ten GRIs each under their leadership and try to evaluate their 
member institutes as well as avoid duplication of work between them. They command 
however no real budgeting power. In the words of one council chairman, research 
councils can only use “name and shame” tactics to expose member institutes 
weaknesses. The real budgeting power lies with the Budget Office instead. 
As a result of this reform, MOST had to transfer the management of all 
programs concerned with applied R&D or R&D commercialization to relevant 
ministries. For example machinery, electronics and aero-technology R&D were 
transferred to MOCIE. However, MOST retained big science, fusion technology and 
science communication programs in its portfolio. In September 2004, the Minister of 
Science and Technology was elevated to the position of Deputy Prime Minister, on 
par with the Ministers of Education and Finance. This underscores yet again the high 
value which is accorded to science in Korea and more importantly, allows him to 
effectively coordinate the other 20 ministries with a share in the government R&D 
budget. This used to be a weak link in the Korean system which has now been cured 
by the elevation which marks the first such incident of its kind in the world, according 
to the OECD.  
Since 75% of GERD is financed and performed by private firms (one of the 
highest levels in the world after Luxemburg and Japan) government is concentrating 
its efforts on support to basic science and on how to best complement business R&D 
through the deployment of an efficient institutional framework in which different 
S&T actors collaborate and share knowledgeKorea’s. To underscore its commitment 
to science as an important driver of economic change government increased its S&T 
budget appropriations by double digit figures each year since 2001, to eventually 
reach 9.5 billion US dollars in 2007 (Table 1). This budget is allocated to 18 
ministries.  
2006 2007
Grand total 65,154 70,827 77,996 89,096 97,629 8.42%
R&D budget 55,768 60,995 67,368 72,283 81,396 7.86%
     general accounting 52,678 57,418 56,612 61,094 65,907 4.58%
     special accounting 3,090 3,577 10,756 11,189 15,489 38.04%
Funds 9,386 9,832 10,628 16,813 16,233 11.58%
Ministry of Science and Technolgy 13,143 14,427 19,609 21,691 23,460 12.29%
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy 12,510 13,903 17,673 19,956 21,836 11.78%
Ministry of National Defence 7,693 7,757 9,087 10,618 12,584 10.34%
Ministry of Education 6,878 7,715 8,778 9,672 10,323 8.46%
Ministry of Information and Communication 6,775 6,643 6,972 8,028 7,833 2.94%
Ministry of Agriculture 2,547 2,787 3,044 3,361 3,674 7.60%
Small and Medium Business Administration 1,765 2,120 2,317 2,679 3,600 15.32%
Ministry of Construction 885 913 1,519 2,620 3,278 29.94%
Ministry of Welfare 1,354 1,537 1,657 1,969; 1,808 5.95%
Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fishing 1,152 1,249 1,406 1,719 1,789 9.20%
Ministry of Environment 1,111 1,264 1,340 1,458 1,678 8.60%
Other 17,055 18,245 13,680 5,013 5,766 -19.50%
CAGR 2003-
2007 in % Unit: 100 million KRW 2003 2004 2005
 
Table 1: Development of government R&D budget in Korea, 2003-2007. Source: MOST, calculations by author. 
 
Summarizing the major effects of the 2004 reform to Korea’s S&T 
governance, we conclude that it represents a definite improvement over the status quo 
ante, especially as concerns the realignment and clarification of policy jurisdictions 
between ministries (MOST, MOCIE and MIC) and the strengthened coordination 
function of the NSTC. On the other hand, we have to remain mindful of other 
problems such as weak university research and underdeveloped ties between private 
firms and university research labs.  
 
Future challenges for Korea’s innovation governance 
 
The world’s S&T landscape is developing rapidly, and certainly Korea’s neighbours 
account for a large share of that advance. From today’s vantage point upstream 
innovation governance is challenged from three angles, i.e. effectiveness, efficiency 
and efficacy.  
a)  Effectiveness concerns the effects of STI policies on growth and employment. 
Korea will harness full effectiveness only if its innovation governance is 
constantly fine-tuned and upgraded to reflect the growing interdisciplinary 
nature of science. The key word in this context used by the OECD is 
“horizontalization”, i.e. the ability of governments to leverage and manage 
third-generation innovation policies as a cross-cutting, inter-departmental 
affair. Also due regard has to be given to the shrinking importance of 
government if it comes to innovation financing (25% public vs. 75% industry 
financed). Here government needs to assume an “enabling role” 
complementing private research efforts. 
b)  Efficiency concerns the inner workings of ongoing R&D programs which are 
numerous in Korea. 21 Future Promising Technologies, Creative Manpower 
Initiative, 6T Technologies, Next Generation Growth Engines, 839 IT strategy 
and others. They are typically run by R&D management organizations (such 
as KOSEF or IITA) that work under the control of specific ministries. 
Whether this unleashes the full potential for cooperation across scientific 
domains and across science-related organizations is a much debated question 
in Korea. It is however safe to say that the rapid proliferation of programs 
raise the danger of duplication.  
c)  Efficacy (the ability to produce a desired amount of a desired effect) concerns 
the degree of policy learning and organizational adjustments. For instance, the 
newly created Office of Science and Technology Innovation (OSTI) is staffed 
in a unique way (see above). And younger policy-makers increasingly see 
themselves as adaptive agents. Very recently, a North-East Asia S&T 
Roundtable was launched, a trilateral forum where Japan, China and Korea 
discuss S&T matters.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper investigated the hypothesis that Korea’s economic competitiveness 
developed in large part thanks to the upstream governance of its national innovation 
system. We found evidence of institutional learning and organizational improvement 
over the past 40 years and ongoing. Though Korea in the past relied on an imitation 
strategy, it would be a mistake to suggest the country would not have needed any NIS. 
This is a misunderstanding of the NIS concept. Korea climbed from pure imitation 
over catch up to technology leadership in certain areas (most notably microchips, TFT 
screens, collaborative online games, cargo shipbuilding). The impending challenge is 
in the transition to a creative innovation system. In closing let me summarize the 
strong and weak aspects of Korea’s current NIS. 
  The 2004 NIS reform is working, but policy horizontalization among 
ministries could still greatly be improved. 
  Strong growth in public R&D budget, but lingering questions about the 
efficiency of spending 
  Number of SCI publications growing rapidly, but their impact factor remains 
low 
  Government keen on promoting science, but number of science students 
shrinking 
  “Hwanggate” (alleged academic misconduct of Hwang Woo-sok) was cleared 
up with resolve, but cases of plagiarism and idea theft are still reported 
elsewhere.
10 
  Regional innovation systems are emerging (particularly in Gyeonggi Province 
around Seoul), but central government accounts for 97% of all R&D spending 
  Public research institutes have been greatly reformed in recent years, but the 
role of the four Research Councils in managing GRIs is still weak (in 
particular they have no budgeting power). 
  In the past the most important research happened in public sector institutes; as 
a consequence the quality of university research in Korea is rather low (but 
catching up). 
  The Roh Moo-hyun government has called for a more visible role of Korea in 
world politics, but bilateral or multilateral government science cooperation in 
North East Asia is not yet properly developed.  
 
This summary is mixed, since every strong point is (partly) neutralized by a weak one. 
However this reflects well the current state of affairs in Korea, where the transition 
from “imitation to innovation”, a favourite government catchphrase, is well under 
way. Korea’s upstream innovation governance has shown signs of “adaptive 
                                                
10 In March, the President of Korea University had to step down after an academic inquiry found him 
guilty of scientific misconduct.  
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Compatibility („inter-operability), complementary goods. (David, 1990; Besen 1984)
Diffusion of innovations/technology, positive externalities, path dependency. (Katz, 1985; 
Farrell, 1987)
Reduction of transaction costs (formal institution). (Kindelberger, 1983)
Standard implementation
Quality standards: deviations are known (ISO 9000, ...).
Compatibility standards: self-enforcing (coordination game), assumption that actors have no 
interest in deviating from the standard. (David, 1994)
“The study of standards creation and adoption has been a fertile area of economic research, 
but research has rarely examined adoption decisions directly, treating them as a 
black box for aggregate-level outcomes.” (West, 1999)
THE COMPATIBILITY STANDARD SAP R/3 THE COMPATIBILITY STANDARD SAP R/3
SAP R/3
ERP-Software
Market leader: dominant design (Tushman, 1986, Utterback 1996)
Different standardization areas in SAP R/3:
(1) Communication (ISO/OSI-Model)
(2) Information (protocols, e.g. TCP/IP, EDI)
(3) Applications (API for complementary goods, e.g. CRM-Software)
(4) Business Processes
Focus on (4) Business ProcessesDEVIATIONS FROM SAP R/3 IN JAPAN? DEVIATIONS FROM SAP R/3 IN JAPAN?
Indicators that Japanese companies deviate from ERP-Software
METI (2001): „the low ratio of ERP introduction by Japanese companies is related to the 
large number of companies which do not use IT for management innovation but rather in 
support of their existing business practices.“
Motohashi (2006): „Even when it [ERP] is introduced, proper modifications of business
practices are not conducted, and it does not contribute to business performance at all.“
ICT usage in companies, international comparison, METI 2001
OBSERVING SAP R/3 DEVIATIONS IN JAPAN OBSERVING SAP R/3 DEVIATIONS IN JAPAN
Aim: Find a global, dominating compatibility standard whose deviation
is not treated in scientific literature (=SAP R/3). 
Observe standard deviation in Japanese automotive supplier industry
(high investments in ERP software).
Possible implementation outcomes of SAP R/3
No Deviation: Implementation of standard according to process reference models
(Practice adjusted to meet standard requirements).
Deviation 1: Customization of standard; add-on-development, specific processes
programmed into the standard. (Practice changes standard)
Deviation 2: Implementation of SAP R/3 as a facade, actual processes not
standardized. (Practice disconnected from standard)AGENDA AGENDA
Deviations from compatibility standards? The case of 
Japanese companies
Theoretical framework
Empirical results: SAP R/3 in Japan
Complementarities of industrial organization with
institutions of the Toyota Production System
Summary
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK I: ACTORS THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK I: ACTORS
Actor perspective: observe the process of technology shaping, not only
the outcome; constructivism (e.g. Pinch & Bijker 1984).
Technology-Acceptance-Model (Davis, 1989; Rogers 1995)
Specific knowledge and organizational capabilities/routines (Penrose 1972, Dosi
1988, Nelson & Winter 1982, 2000)
Power relations & sanctions (Star 1995, Esser 2000)
Institutional framework around actor perspective
Institutional complementarities with formal and informal rules that influence actor
behaviour on a higher level.AGENDA AGENDA
Deviations from compatibility standards? The case of 
Japanese companies
Theoretical framework
Empirical results: SAP R/3 in Japan
Complementarities of industrial organization with




Explorative case study: Japanese supplier for Diesel pumps („PUMP“), October
2004.
In-depth case study: Japanese component and system producer for brakes
(„BRAKE“), between October 2004 - March 2006. Focus: time survey of processes
in production planning.
Interviews
50 expert interviews with participants from the automotive industry, consultants, 
ERP-vendors, etc. (January 2004 - March 2006). Aim: Validation the results of the
case studies.IN IN- -DEPTH CASE STUDY  DEPTH CASE STUDY „ „BRAKE BRAKE“ “
BRAKE: supplier to all major OEM (mainly Toyota)
Willing to introduce „pure SAP R/3“ (implementation start in 2002).
Focus on production planning (indications from PUMP).
Interviews with production planning employees
BRAKE used elements from the Toyota Production System for
production administration.
SAP R/3 used for production planning (program and material planning). 
SAP R/3 not physically integrated into production administration.
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(d)„ „BRAKE BRAKE“ “ TIME SURVEY TIME SURVEY
Left-hand process
overview shows time 
used for each process in 
production planning.
Base: extrapolation of 3 
months for 1 year, 201 
employees.
Result: Time spent for
stock-outs of material 
and products about
18.000 hrs./year
Time spent on on-site












  (Auszüge aus BRAKE Aktivitäts-Survey für 2004, Angaben in h, hochgerechnet auf 1 Jahr) 7,549 189,803 867 198,218
Planungs-Aktivitäten 43 492 89 624
Nachfrage-Prognose 170 170
Analyse der Lead-time 103 103
Festlegen von Ziel-Lagerbeständen 43 218 262
Produktionsplan (Bestellungen) 3,264 20,587 327 24,178
Datensammlung von OEM 29 698 727
SAP-Dateneingabe 1,654 2,923 4,576
Erstellung und Aktualisierung des Produktionsplans 1,044 4,728 5,772
Prüfung von Lagerbeständen (online) 533 3,103 3,636
Übermittlung des Produktionsplans (intern und extern) 5 2,136 2,141
Anderes 6,998 6,998
Disposition der Materialbestellungen 589 48,088 282 48,959
Anpassung/Einstellung von Order Kanban 2,909 2,909
Abwicklung der Bestellvorgänge mit Zulieferern 8,592 8,592
Wareneingang und Prüfung 86 4,207 4,294
Interner Warentransport 407 22,775 23,182
Monitoring der Materialbestände 10 5,904 5,914
Interne Kommunikation und Abstimmung 86 3,701 3,787
Warenausgang 1,523 97,118 0 98,641
Dokumentation (Lieferscheine, etc.) 466 15,029 15,495
Zusammenstellung von Lieferungen 40,908 40,908
Verpackung 336 14,126 14,462
Transport der Waren (bis zur Sammelstelle) 485 5,506 5,990
Transport der Waren (Sammelstelle bis Warenausgang) 8,045 8,045
Transport der Waren (Warenausgang bis LKW) 137 137
Handling von Containern 187 8,722 8,909
Dateneingabe 16 3,922 3,937
Sortierung von Kanban-Karten 34 725 758
Enpässe bei fertigen und halbfertigen Produkten 1,078 3,048 149 4,274
Kommunikation mit OEM 1,003 1,003
Kommunikation mit Lager 103 1,291 1,394
Anpassung des Produktionsplans 974 754 1,728
Enpässe bei Material 1,051 12,355 0 13,406
Kommunikation mit Lager 295 3,298 3,593
Anpassung des Produktionsplans (in SAP) 1,325 1,325
Anpassung des Produktionsablaufs mit Kanban 391 802 1,193
Kommunikation mit Zulieferern 38 2,861 2,899
Suchen nach Material 326 4,070 4,397
System-Administration 0 8,114 19 8,134
Entwicklung 1,085 1,085
Wartung und Betrieb 4,442 4,442
Troubleshooting 2,587 2,587
„ „BRAKE BRAKE“ “ PROBLEM AREAS IN PROD. PLANNING PROBLEM AREAS IN PROD. PLANNING
High resistance against SAP R/3 production planning process.
Production plan creation with SAP R/3 in BRAKE made almost
impossible for planning staff.
Disconnection of practice from standard SAP R/3.
Compatibility standard adjusted (practice changes standard SAP R/3).AGENDA AGENDA
Deviations from compatibility standards? The case of 
Japanese companies
Theoretical framework
Empirical results: SAP R/3 in Japan
Complementarities of industrial organization with
institutions of the Toyota Production System
Summary
Complementarities that
cause SAP R/3 deviations
Complementarities that
cause SAP R/3 deviations







as competing formal institutions










Production keiretsu as 
governance mechanism
Integral product & 
process architecture













Power structuresROLE MODELS INFLUENCING TECHNOLOGY ACCEPTANCE ROLE MODELS INFLUENCING TECHNOLOGY ACCEPTANCE
Japanese/Toyota production system (TPS) is a network of 
formal and informal rules.
Formal rules: example kanban
Informal rules: example kanban
Low acceptance of SAP R/3: low perceived usefulness
(mismatching with mental models; gap to reality of 
Japanese production).
Complementarities that
cause SAP R/3 deviations
Complementarities that
cause SAP R/3 deviations







as competing formal institutions
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Missing matching with own
processes
ERP-introduction in preparation ERP already introduced ERP not introduced
Complementarities that
cause SAP R/3 deviations
Complementarities that
cause SAP R/3 deviations







as competing formal institutions
Low power status of ICT department
and external consultants
Institutional mechanisms for
Decentralization and FlexibiltySPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF PROD. WORKERS SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF PROD. WORKERS
TPS is a set of institutions that have channeled knowledge
accumulation.
Implicit knowledge in kanban production. 
No formalization of practice as achieved in SAP R/3 
production planning (reference model process chain).
Specific routines are difficult to separate, as they consist of 
complementary formal and informal rules.
Complementarities that
cause SAP R/3 deviations
Complementarities that
cause SAP R/3 deviations
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SANCTIONING OF PRODUCTION SYSTEM THROUGH OEM SANCTIONING OF PRODUCTION SYSTEM THROUGH OEM
Japanese production system processes include suppliers
(example: flexible JIT-production)
Production planning systems and routines have to be
adjusted between several companies: High integration of 
OEM and supplier processes
Sanctioning of in-house standards and routines through
OEM.
High legitimy of TPS: example „Monozukuri Philosophy“
Usage of TPS rules is a precondition for transactions with
Toyota (kanban, DRBFM, ...): this leads to adjustments of 
SAP R/3.
Complementarities that
cause SAP R/3 deviations
Complementarities that
cause SAP R/3 deviations







as competing formal institutions
Low power status of ICT department
and external consultants
Institutional mechanisms for
Decentralization and FlexibiltyLOW POWER STATUS OF ICT LOW POWER STATUS OF ICT- -DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT
ICT often not represented in corporate management
(below: CIO posts in Japanese companies).
No role change of ICT staff with SAP-introduction.
Complementarities that
cause SAP R/3 deviations
Complementarities that
cause SAP R/3 deviations







as competing formal institutions




PROPRIETARY STANDARDS AS FORMAL INSTITUTIONS PROPRIETARY STANDARDS AS FORMAL INSTITUTIONS
High amount of private in-house standards that are
issued by the OEM.
Lock-in into proprietary standards such as TOPICS 
(complementary formal institution to TPS).
Comparison: European and US-companies favor
industry-wide standards (danger of holdup leads to low
investment into specific assets).
Complementarities that
cause SAP R/3 deviations
Complementarities that
cause SAP R/3 deviations







as competing formal institutions
Low power status of ICT department
and external consultants
Institutional mechanisms for
Decentralization and FlexibiltyDECENTRALIZATION AND FLEXIBILITY DECENTRALIZATION AND FLEXIBILITY
Differences in production planning between SAP R/3 and 
kanban
SAP: focus on central planning, real-time data, efficiency, push-
production, susceptible to errors.
Kanban: independence, flexibility, transfer of responsibility to factory floor.
MRP (Material Requirements Planning)
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Pn
Production Order
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Pn




cause SAP R/3 deviations
Complementarities that
cause SAP R/3 deviations
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Deviations from compatibility standards? The case of 
Japanese companies
Theoretical framework
Empirical results: SAP R/3 in Japan
Complementarities of industrial organization with
institutions of the Toyota Production System









SAP (n=58) 8.6 5.2 13.8 62.1 19 65.5 22.4 39.7 44.8 0 17.2
GLOVIA-C (n=31) 61.3 45.2 22.6 19.4 48.4 6.5 19.4 16.1 0 16.1 0
OBIC 7 (n=21) 47.6 47.6 23.8 42.9 19 0 14.3 9.5 4.8 19 0
COMPANY (n=21) 47.6 47.6 47.6 38.1 23.8 9.5 14.3 23.8 9.5 19 14.3
Super Stream (n=19) 31.6 47.4 36.8 26.3 21.1 5.3 15.8 42.1 26.3 36.8 0






















SAP R/3 AS A QUALITY STANDARD SAP R/3 AS A QUALITY STANDARD
Rather than a compatibility standard, 
SAP R/3 is used partly as a quality
standard in Japan.
SAP R/3 as a certificate: „the best-
run companies run SAP“.
Costs from lack of compatibility are
internalized from actors (corporate
management).SUMMARY: STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND COMPLEMENTARITIES SUMMARY: STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND COMPLEMENTARITIES
Standard implementation faces obstacles due to complementarities within the
institutional setting.
Rules affect actors and their self-commitment: role models of production staff (flexible 
production, rotation, ...), consultants (with preference for specific solutions), management
(low representation of ICT, high valuation of production).
Sanction: Production system sanctionized by OEM (especially Toyota) which reduces
options for process adjustments together with SAP R/3 implementations.
Deviations from compatibility standards occur when facing institutional conflicts.
Deviation Type 1: Standard disconnected from practice.
Factual refusal of SAP R/3-processes in production area.
Occurs in case of strong conflicts between actors (management with standardization
mission, refusal of central planning in production)
Deviation Type 2: Standard adjusted according to practice.
High level of adjustment to existing processes („add-on developer“ on business card)
Occurs as a result of consensus-oriented interaction between actor groups.
END END
Thank you very much for your attention.
Alexander Müller





Seit Juli 1995 publiziert das Institut für 
Ostasienwissenschaften eine eigene Reihe 
von Arbeitspapieren. Sie werden in 
begrenzter Zahl kostenlos abgegeben. Mit 
* gekennzeichnete Papiere sind zudem 
über Internet abrufbar.  
Duisburg Working Papers 
on East Asian Studies 
 
Since July, 1995, the Institute of East 
Asian Studies publishes its own series of 
working papers which are available free of 
charge. Papers marked * can be called up 




Institut für Ostasienwissenschaften  
Universität Duisburg-Essen 







Institute of East Asian Studies 
Universität Duisburg-Essen 






No. 30 / 2000*  K. Shire, J.Imai 
Flexible Equality: Men and Women in Employment in Japan 
No. 31 / 2000*  Th. Heberer 
Some Considerations on China’s Minorities in the 21
st Century: Conflict or 
conciliation? 
No. 32 / 2000*  Th. Heberer, S. Jakobi 
Henan - The Model: From Hegemonism to Fragmentism. Portrait of the 
Political Culture of China's Most Populated Province 
No. 33 / 2000*  W. Flüchter 
German Geographical Research on Japan 
No. 34 / 2000*  U. Jürgens, W. Pascha, C. Storz 
Workshop Organisation und Ordnung der japanischen Wirtschaft I  
- Themenschwerpunkt: "New Economy" - Neue Formen der 
Arbeitsorganisation in Japan - 
No. 35 / 2001*  C. Derichs, Th. Heberer, P. Raszelenberg (Hg.) 
Task Force – Ein Gutachten zu den politischen und wirtschaftlichen 
Beziehungen Ostasien-NRW 
No. 36 / 2001*  Th. Heberer 
Falungong - Religion, Sekte oder Kult?  
Eine Heilsgemeinschaft als Manifestation von Modernisierungsproblemen 
und sozialen Entfremdungsprozessen   114
No. 37 / 2001*  Zhang Luocheng 
The particularities and major problems of minority regions in the middle 
and western parts of China and their developmental strategy 
No. 38 / 2001*  C. Derichs 
Interneteinsatz in den Duisburger Ostasienwissenschaften: Ein 
Erfahrungsbericht am Beispiel des deutsch-japanischen Seminars „DJ50“ 
No. 39 / 2001*  Anja-Désirée Senz, Zhu Yi 
Von Ashima zu Yi-Rap: Die Darstellung nationaler Minderheiten in den 
chinesischen Medien am Beispiel der Yi-Nationalität 
No. 40 / 2001*  W. Pascha, F. Robaschik 
The Role of Japanese Local Governments in Stabilisation Policy 
No. 41 / 2001*  Thomas Heberer, Claudia Derichs (Hg.) 
Task Force – Ein Gutachten zu Beschäftigungspolitik, Altersvorsorge und 
Sozialstandards in Ostasien 
No. 42 / 2002*  Karin Adelsberger, Claudia Derichs, Thomas Heberer, Patrick Raszelenberg 
Der 11. September und die Folgen in Asien. Politische Reaktionen in der 
VR China, Japan, Malaysia und Vietnam 
No. 43 / 2002*  Werner Pascha, Klaus Ruth, Cornelia Storz (Hg.) 
Workshop Organisation und Ordnung der japanischen Wirtschaft II 
Themenschwerpunkt: Einfluss von IT-Technologien auf Strukturen und 
Prozesse in Unternehmen 
No. 44 / 2002*  Werner Pascha 
Wirtschaftspolitische Reformen in Japan – Kultur als Hemmschuh? 
No. 45 / 2002*  Thomas Heberer, Markus Taube 
  China, the European Union and the United States of America: Partners or 
Competitors? 
No. 46 / 2002*    Thomas Heberer 
Strategische Gruppen und Staatskapazität: Das Beispiel der       
Privatunternehmer in China 
No. 47 / 2003*   Ulrich Zur-Lienen 
Singapurs Strategie  zur Integration seiner multiethnischen Bevölkerung: 
Was sich begegnet, gleich sich an  
No. 48 / 2003*   Institute for East Asian Studies (Hg.) 
                           Overview of East Asian Studies in Central and Eastern Europe 
No. 49 / 2003*    Werner Pascha, Cornelia Storz (Hg.) 
Workshop Organisation und Ordnung der japanischen Wirtschaft III 
Themenschwerpunkt: Institutionenökonomik und Japanstudien  
No. 50 / 2003*    Kotaro Oshige 
Arbeitsmarktstruktur und industrielle Beziehungen in Japan – Eine 
Bestandsaufnahme mit Thesen zur Zukunftsentwicklung 
No. 51 / 2003*    Markus Taube 
        Chinas Rückkehr in die Weltgemeinschaft  
        Triebkräfte und Widerstände auf dem Weg zu einem „Global Player“ 
 
 
   115
No. 52 / 2003*    Claudia Derichs und Wolfram Schaffar (Hg) 
Task Force – Interessen, Machtstrukturen und internationale Regime.  
Die WTO-Verhandlungen zum GATS (Dienstleistungsabkommen) und sein 
Einfluss auf Asien 
No. 53 / 2003*  Hermann Halbeisen 
Taiwan’s Domestic Politics since the Presidential Elections 2000 
No. 54 / 2004*  Thomas Heberer 
Ethnis Entrepreneurs as Agents of Social Change – Entrepreneurs, Clans, 
Social Obligations, and ethnic resources: The case of Liangshan Yi in 
Sichuan 
No. 55 / 2004*    Werner Pascha, Cornelia Storz 
Workshop Organisation und Ordnung der japanischen Wirtschaft IV 
Themenschwerpunkt: Wahrnehmung, Institutionenökonomik und 
Japanstudien 
No. 56 / 2004*  Anja D. Senz 
Wählen zwischen Recht und Pflicht – Ergebnisse einer Exkursion der 
Ostasienwissenschaften in die Provinz Sichuan / VR China 
No. 57 / 2004*  Dorit Lehrack 
NGO im heutigen China – Aufgaben, Rolle und Selbstverständnis 
No. 58 / 2004*  Li Minghuan 
Labour Brokerage in China Today: Formal and Informal Dimensions 
No. 59 / 2004*  Li Fan 
  Come by the wind: Li Fan’s story in Bunyun election 
No. 60 / 2004*    Thomas Heberer, Anja D. Senz 
Feldforschung in Asien: Erlebnisse und Ergebnisse aus der Sicht 
politikwissenschaftlicher Ostasienforschung 
No. 61 / 2004*  Thomas Heberer, Nora Sausmikat 
Bilden sich in China Strukturen einer Zivilgesellschaft heraus?   
No. 62 / 2004*    Jun Imai 
                            The Rise of Temporary Employment in Japan: Legalisation and Expansion  
        of a Non-Regular Employment Form 
No. 63 / 2005*    Thorsten Nilges 
Zunehmende Verschuldung durch Mikrokredite – Auswertung eines 
Experiments in Südindien 
No. 64 / 2005*    Christian Göbel, Thomas Heberer 
Task Force: Zivilgesellschaftliche Entwicklung in China 
Task Force: Civil Societal Developments in China 
No. 65 / 2006*    Werner Pascha, Cornelia Storz (Hg.) 
Workshop Organisation und Ordnung der japanischen Wirtschaft, 
Themenschwerpunkt: Deutschlandjahr in Japan – Eine Zwischenbilanz 
No. 66 / 2006*    Momoyo Hüstebeck 
Park Geun-hye: Als Präsidententochter zur ersten Staatspräsidentin 
Südkoreas? 
No. 67 / 2006*    Momoyo Hüstebeck 
Tanaka Makiko: Scharfzüngige Populistin oder populäre Reformerin?  
   116
No. 68 / 2006*    Thomas Heberer 
Institutional Change and Legitimacy via Urban Elections? 
People’s Awareness of Elections and Participation in Urban 
Neighbourhoods (Shequ)  
No. 69 / 2006*    Christian Göbel 
The Peasant’s Rescue from the Cadre? 
An Institutional Analysis of China’s Rural Tax and Fee Reform 
No. 70 / 2006*    Werner Pascha, Cornelia Storz (Hg.) 
Workshop Institutionen in der Entwicklung Ostasiens I 
Offenheit und Geschlossenheit asiatischer Wirtschaftssysteme 
No. 71 / 2006*    Norifumi Kawai 
Spatial Determinants of Japanese Manufacturing Firms in the Czech 
Republic 
No. 72 / 2007*    Werner Pascha, Cornelia Storz, Markus Taube (eds.) 
Workshop Series on the Role of Institutions in East Asian Development: 
Institutional Foundations of Innovation and Competitiveness in East Asia 
 
 
 